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GOOD CONDUCT TIME FOR PRISONERS:
WHY (AND HOW) WISCONSIN SHOULD
PROVIDE CREDITS TOWARD EARLY
RELEASE
MICHAEL O’HEAR*
Wisconsin is one of about twenty states not offering good conduct
time (GCT) to prisoners. In most states, prisoners are able to earn GCT
credits toward accelerated release through good behavior. Wisconsin
itself had GCT for more than a century, but eliminated it as part of a set
of reforms in the 1980s and 1990s that left the state with what may be the
nation’s most inflexible system for the release of prisoners. Although
some of these reforms helpfully brought greater certainty to punishment,
they went too far in eliminating nearly all meaningful recognition and
encouragement of good behavior and rehabilitative progress. This Essay
explains why and how Wisconsin should reinstitute GCT, drawing on
social scientific research on the effects of GCT, public opinion surveys in
Wisconsin and across the United States regarding sentencing policy, and
an analysis of the GCT laws in place in other jurisdictions. Although the
Essay focuses particularly on Wisconsin’s circumstances, the basic
argument for GCT is more generally applicable, and much of the analysis
should be of interest to policymakers in other states, too.
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 488
WISCONSIN’S PATH TO HYPER-DETERMINACY............................. 492
A. Hyper-Indeterminacy, 1889–1984 .............................................. 492
B. Moderate Indeterminacy, 1984–1999 ......................................... 496
C. Hyper-Determinacy, 1999–2009................................................. 498
D. Moderate Determinacy, 2009–2011 ........................................... 504
E. Hyper-Determinacy: Destination or Detour? ........................... 508
III. THE DUBIOUS CASE FOR HYPER-DETERMINACY ........................ 510
A. Democratic Accountability ......................................................... 510
B. Victim Rights ............................................................................... 513
C. Public Safety................................................................................ 516
* Professor and Associate Dean for Research, Marquette University Law School. B.A.,
J.D. Yale University.

488

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:487

IV. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR INDETERMINACY AND GOOD
CONDUCT TIME ................................................................................. 522
A. Support for Indeterminacy in Wisconsin .................................. 522
B. Support for Indeterminacy in the Nation as a Whole ............ 526
V. GOOD CONDUCT TIME IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS........................ 529
A. Overview ...................................................................................... 529
B. Specific Jurisdictions .................................................................. 532
1. Federal System ................................................................... 532
2. Illinois
.......................................................................... 534
3. Washington ......................................................................... 536
VI. GOOD CONDUCT TIME IN THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ............ 538
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR GOOD CONDUCT TIME IN WISCONSIN ............ 542
A. The Case for Good Conduct Time: A Recapitulation ............. 542
B. How to Structure Good Conduct Time in Wisconsin.............. 544
1. Maximum Amount of GCT Discount ............................. 544
2. Conditions for Earning GCT ............................................ 545
3. Offense-Based Exclusions and Limitations .................... 547
4. Disciplinary Sanctions ....................................................... 547
5. Deferral of GCT Release .................................................. 548
6. Relationship to Extended Supervision ............................ 549
7. Fair Notice .......................................................................... 550
8. Effective Date and Retroactivity ..................................... 550
C. Differences From 2009 Reforms................................................ 551
VIII. CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 552
I.

INTRODUCTION

When a person commits a wrong against his community, that person
deserves to be censured and even, in extreme cases, to be physically
excluded from the community. However, when the wrongdoer fully
atones for his bad conduct, he deserves no less to be restored to full
membership in the community. Even in cases of great harm, where full
atonement may seem impossible, the wrongdoer’s efforts to achieve
some meaningful degree of atonement should be recognized and
encouraged by the community. The tireless quest for the lost sheep, the
joyful welcoming of the prodigal son—these parables resonate deeply in
western culture and highlight our obligation not merely to condemn
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wrongdoing, but also to do what we can to make reconciliation possible
and to restore the wrongdoer to the community.1
This intuitive moral logic underlay the Supreme Court’s
extraordinary decision in Graham v. Florida, which banned the sentence
of life without the possibility of parole for most crimes committed by
juveniles.2 In explaining why this sentence violated the Eighth
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the Court
observed that the sentence denies
any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no matter what
[the offender] might do to demonstrate that the bad acts he
committed as a teenager are not representative of his true
character, even if he spends the next half century attempting to
atone for his crimes and learn from his mistakes.3
The prisoner’s efforts to improve himself and atone for his wrongdoing,
the Court suggests, should be reciprocated by society through a
meaningful consideration of early release.4
A similar moral logic points to the essential injustice of any
sentencing system that is wholly devoid of any flexibility as to release
dates. In the 1990s, dozens of states adopted laws that substantially
curtailed parole, which had long been the standard mechanism in the
United States for recognizing and encouraging good conduct and
rehabilitative progress by prisoners.5 However, few of these “truth in
sentencing” (TIS) laws entirely eliminated back-end flexibility. For
instance, many states limited the new parole restrictions to their most
serious violent offenders.6 Moreover, even for the violent offenders,
about half of the TIS laws preserved some possibility of parole.7 Among
the remaining states that eliminated parole, nearly all retained the
1. For a more extensive statement of these ideas about atonement and its relationship
to punishment, see Michael M. O’Hear, Solving the Good-Time Puzzle: Why Following the
Rules Should Get You Out of Prison Early, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 195, 214–22.
2. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
3. Id. at 2033.
4. See id. For a more complete discussion of this aspect of Graham, see Michael M.
O’Hear, Not Just Kid Stuff? Extending Graham and Miller to Adults, 78 MO. L. REV. 1087,
1101–05 (2013).
5. See WILLIAM J. SABOL, KATHERINE ROSICH, KAMALA MALLIK KANE, DAVID P.
KIRK & GLENN DUBIN, URBAN INST., THE INFLUENCES OF TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING
REFORMS ON CHANGES IN STATES’ SENTENCING PRACTICES AND PRISON POPULATIONS 7
(2002).
6. Id. at 9.
7. Id. at 20.
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possibility of “good conduct time” (GCT) release—that is, early release
based on the accumulation of credits for good behavior in prison.8
Typically, these states permitted release at the eighty-five percent mark
(assuming all possible GCT credits were earned), while three states set
even earlier release possibilities.9
In 1998, Wisconsin adopted what may have been the nation’s most
rigid TIS law. The law was distinctive in combining three features: (1) it
was not limited to serious violent crimes, but covered all felonies; (2) it
not just scaled back but entirely eliminated the possibility of parole
release; and (3) it made no allowance for early release based on good
conduct time.10 Another aspect of the law greatly enhanced the
practical significance of the new system’s extraordinary inflexibility:
statutory maximum sentences were raised across the board.11 The
predictable result was a dramatic increase in the real length of time that
Wisconsin prisoners were required to serve.12 The enhancement of the
statutory maxima was only partly undone by trailer legislation in 2002,
which also made a small gesture in the direction of back-end flexibility
by creating a new opportunity for judicial sentence modification.13
Modest in design, this new provision has been rarely utilized in
practice.14 Wisconsin continues to have what may be the nation’s most
extreme TIS system.15
Wisconsin’s TIS law has often been criticized, and rightfully so, as a
colossal waste of taxpayer money16— a contributor to a bloated state
prison population that is twice that of neighboring Minnesota’s, despite
the remarkably similar size and crime rates of the two states.17
8. Id.
9. Id. at 21–23.
10. Michael M. O’Hear & Darren Wheelock, Imprisonment Inertia and Public Attitudes
Toward “Truth in Sentencing,” 2015 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 11),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2418282, archived at http://per
ma.cc/F9UZ-8XCM.
11. Id.
12. Mary Zahn & Gina Barton, Locked In: The Price of Truth in Sentencing,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 2004, at 1A.
13. O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 17–18).
14. Jesse J. Norris, The Earned Release Revolution: Early Assessments and State-Level
Strategies, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1551, 1582 n.148 (2012).
15. See, e.g., Zahn & Barton, supra note 12.
16. See, e.g., id. (estimating cost of TIS as $1.8 billion for inmates admitted through
2025).
17. Michael M. O’Hear, Mass Incarceration in Three Midwestern States: Origins and
Trends, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 709, 717–19, 735, 740 (2013).
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However, the fundamental flaw of the Wisconsin system is not fiscal in
nature, but ethical. The TIS laws of other states have preserved
meaningful opportunities for inmates to earn early release, even if these
opportunities are now significantly more limited than they were a
generation ago.18 To varying degrees, these other TIS laws embody a
hope and expectation that prisoners will work to better themselves
during their time behind bars. They send a message that society will
recognize rehabilitative progress and positive behavior and would like
to welcome prisoners back to the community sooner rather than later.
Wisconsin’s law, by contrast, sends the harshly dismissive message that
nothing much is expected of prisoners—that society simply wishes to
exclude them for as long as possible. Wisconsin’s TIS sentences are
cruel for much the same reason as the sentences found unconstitutional
in Graham: they deny “any meaningful opportunity” to obtain early
release, “no matter what [the offender] might do to demonstrate that
[his] bad acts . . . are not representative of his true character,” and no
matter how hard he might work at “attempting to atone for his crimes
and learn from his mistakes.”19
To be clear, I do not intend to argue in this Essay that TIS sentences
are unconstitutional; tilting at that particular windmill can await another
day. Rather, my present purpose is to argue for legislative change to an
exceptionally harsh sentencing system. Legislators, no less than judges,
should be mindful of the ethical significance of the penal laws they
adopt and maintain.
To argue that Wisconsin’s TIS system has gone too far is not
necessarily to seek a return to the pre-TIS system of largely
uncontrolled and unpredictable parole release.20 My aim is considerably
more modest: the institution of a new system of good conduct time
credits that would permit release, at the earliest, after an inmate has
served two-thirds of his prison sentence. Such a system would restore
meaningful recognition of good behavior in prison, but would still avoid
the worst vices of the old system, which permitted release as early as the
one-quarter mark of the sentence.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part II briefly recapitulates the
history of parole, good conduct time, and truth in sentencing in
Wisconsin. Part III critically examines the case that has been made for
18. See SABOL ET AL., supra note 5, at 18–23.
19. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010).
20. The pre-TIS system is described in more detail in Part II below.
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truth in sentencing in Wisconsin. Part IV examines polling research and
demonstrates that GCT is consistent with the values and policy
preferences of most Wisconsin voters. Part V surveys the widespread
use of GCT in other U.S. jurisdictions. Part VI considers what the
empirical literature has to say about GCT, highlighting the potential for
GCT to reduce prison misconduct, recidivism, and corrections budgets.
Part VII presents a specific proposal for reinstituting GCT in Wisconsin.
Finally, Part VIII concludes.
II. WISCONSIN’S PATH TO HYPER-DETERMINACY
Over the past generation, Wisconsin has had four distinct regimes
governing release dates from prison. These regimes have varied
considerably in their determinacy—that is, the degree of certainty at the
time a sentence is imposed about how much time the defendant will
actually serve behind bars before release. Schematically, these regimes
might be conceptualized as lying on a continuum:

Moderate
Indeterminacy

HyperIndeterminacy

Moderate
Determinacy

Midpoint

HyperDeterminacy

This Part briefly describes each of Wisconsin’s four recent regimes
and then considers what lessons may be drawn from the history.
A. Hyper-Indeterminacy, 1889–1984
For most of the twentieth century, Wisconsin’s corrections system
might be fairly described as one of hyper-indeterminacy. The system’s
roots lie deep in the nineteenth century, reflecting certain fundamental
changes in American penal practices and attitudes during that time
period.
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In the years between the Revolution and the Civil War,
imprisonment largely displaced execution, public whipping, and other
forms of corporal punishment as the standard sentence for serious
crimes in the United States.21 For as long as there have been prisons,
however, corrections officials have struggled to maintain institutional
order.22 Initially, the whip was the chief enforcer of discipline.23
However, whipping behind prison walls provoked some of the same
criticisms as had whipping in the public square—criticisms grounded in
humanitarian sensibilities and hopes for offender rehabilitation.24 As
two keen observers of the early penitentiaries queried,
To what point are corporal chastisements reconcilable with the
object of the penitentiary system itself, which is the reformation
of the guilty? If this pain be ignominious, does it not go directly
against the end which we propose to obtain, viz., to awaken the
morality of an individual, fallen in his own opinion?25
By the 1850s, prison reformers seeking more humane and effective
techniques for maintaining discipline hit upon the idea of good conduct
time.26 The award of credits toward early release created a positive
incentive for prisoners to follow prison rules, while the threat of losing
credits already earned created a negative incentive that seemed less
barbarous than the whip.27
Following the national trend, the Wisconsin Legislature adopted
good conduct time in 1860.28 For each month of good conduct, the State
Prison Commissioner was authorized to reduce an inmate’s sentence by
as many as five days, subject to annulment by the Governor for
subsequent misconduct.29 Highlighting the Legislature’s reintegrationist
21. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 73–
75, 77–82 (1993).
22. See, e.g., G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES, AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 39–47 (Francis Lieber
trans. 1833) (discussing disciplinary techniques at earliest American penitentiaries).
23. Id. at 41–42.
24. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 74, 76 (describing nineteenth-century criticisms of
public whipping).
25. DE BEAUMONT & DE TOQUEVILLE, supra note 22, at 44.
26. THOMAS G. BLOMBERG & KAROL LUCKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY: A HISTORY
OF CONTROL 75 (2010).
27. Id.
28. Act Relating to the Discipline of Convicts in the State Prisons, ch. 324, 1860 Wis.
Laws 321.
29. Id. § 1, 1860 Wis. Laws at 321–22.
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aims, the same enactment also gave corrections officials the authority to
reward an inmate’s record of “good character for obedience, industry
and integrity” with a restoration of citizenship upon release from
prison.30
The adoption of GCT in Wisconsin and other states foreshadowed a
far more dramatic expansion of sentencing indeterminacy in the decades
following the Civil War. This shift was associated with the emergence of
a new “progressive penology,” which sought to develop more scientific
and humane approaches to offender rehabilitation.31
“Classical
penology” had emphasized general deterrence as the overriding aim of
punishment; this orientation called for a system of graduated penalties
based on the severity of the offense, which left little room for varying
the length of incarceration based on the inmate’s performance behind
bars.32 Progressive thinkers, however, rejected the classical assumption
that crime resulted from a rational cost–benefit calculus by criminals.33
The progressives saw little point in using punishment to try to send
finely calibrated deterrence messages to the general public, but were
instead more interested in identifying the individual rehabilitative needs
of each offender and tailoring the prison experience, including its
duration, to those needs.34
In line with the new thinking, Wisconsin significantly expanded and
regularized good conduct time in 1880.35 While under the 1860 law a
prisoner might earn at most about two months of good conduct time per
year, the 1880 law permitted a full six months per year for longerserving inmates.36 Moreover, while the 1860 law had made the
reduction of sentences purely a matter of official discretion, the 1880 law
specified, “Every convict who . . . shall conduct himself in a peaceful and
obedient manner, and faithfully perform all the duties required of him,
shall be entitled to a diminution of time from the term of his sentence.”37

30. Id. § 3, 1860 Wis. Laws at 322.
31. BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 26, at 70–71.
32. Id. at 32–34.
33. See id. at 71.
34. Id.
35. Act to Promote Good Order and Repress Crime, ch. 238, 1880 Wis. Laws 274.
36. Id. § 1, 1880 Wis. Laws at 274–75; see also Act Relating to the Discipline of Convicts
in the State Prisons, ch. 324, § 1, 1860 Wis. Laws 321, 321–22.
37. Act to Promote Good Order and Repress Crime § 1, 1880 Wis. Laws at 274–75
(emphasis added).
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Although GCT continued its national expansion in the progressive
period, eventually becoming established in all forty-six states by 1910,38
parole proved to be the preeminent institutional expression of the new
penology.
The device was pioneered by New York’s Elmira
Reformatory, which was built as a model progressive institution in
1876.39 The hope was to “instill in offenders a self-regulated discipline
because release dates were to be based on visible proof of reformation.
Once satisfactory progress had been demonstrated, the offender would
be released to enter into a period of community supervision . . . .”40 The
idea caught on quickly, and forty-one states had parole laws in place by
1910.41 By 1942, the final holdout states, all located in the South, were
also on board.42
Wisconsin’s first parole law, adopted in 1889,43 reflected the new
national emphasis on penal flexibility. Under this law, judges were
authorized to impose a “general sentence of imprisonment.”44 Such a
sentence specified no particular duration, but instead turned the
defendant over to prison authorities for what might prove to be any
amount of time between the statutory minimum and the statutory
maximum “depending upon [the defendant’s] conduct and the evidences
of [his] probable reformation.”45 Thus, for instance, a robber receiving a
general sentence might have spent anywhere from one to seven years in
prison,46 a child rapist anywhere from ten to thirty years,47 and an
arsonist anywhere from three to fourteen years48—all at the discretion
of the State Board of Supervision.49 This level of extreme uncertainty in
release dates may fairly be characterized as “hyper-indeterminacy.”

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

BLOMBERG & LUCKEN, supra note 26, at 75.
Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 76.
Joan Petersilia, Probation and Parole, in THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME &
PUNISHMENT 563, 567–68 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
43. Act of April 15, 1889, ch. 390, 1889 Wis. Laws 551.
44. Id. § 1, 1889 Wis. Laws at 551. Excluded were those defendants convicted of first- or
second-degree murder who had previously been convicted of a felony and served a term of
imprisonment. Id.
45. Id. at 552.
46. WIS. STAT. § 4378 (1889).
47. Id. § 4381.
48. Id. § 4399.
49. See Act of April 15, 1889 § 1, 1889 Wis. Laws at 552.
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Parole and good conduct time remained central pillars of the
Wisconsin criminal justice system for many decades thereafter. As the
era of hyper-indeterminacy was coming to a close in the early 1980s, the
GCT system established in 1880—a full century earlier—remained
intact,50 augmented by the possibility of additional credits for inmates
“whose diligence in labor or study surpasses the general average.”51
Meanwhile, parole had been restructured a bit from its earliest form, but
remained an area of vast discretion and indeterminacy. Judges no
longer imposed a “general sentence,” but set a specific term of years
that, in effect, merely established the maximum amount of time the
offender might serve behind bars.52 The State Department of Health
and Social Services, which administered the prison system, could release
an offender on parole as soon as he had served one-half of the statutory
minimum for the offense.53 Indeed, statutory minima were not much of
a constraint on parole since only Class A felonies included a statutory
minimum in the state’s general felony classification system.54
B. Moderate Indeterminacy, 1984–1999
In Wisconsin and elsewhere, regimes of hyper-indeterminacy
reflected the ascendance of progressive penology through much of the
twentieth century. However, indeterminacy and progressive penology
came under sustained attack from both the Left and the Right in the
1970s, and states increasingly looked for new approaches. From the
Left, criticisms focused on the need for fairer processes and more
uniform treatment of similar cases; all of the discretion that went along
with parole seemed to invite arbitrary or discriminatory decision
making.55 From the Right, the call was for toughness—an end to the
coddling of criminals by soft-hearted judges and corrections officials,
particularly against the backdrop of long-term, dramatic increases in the
American crime rate in the 1960s and 1970s.56 Underlying both lines of
criticism was an emerging consensus that corrections officials were
50. WIS. STAT. § 53.11(1) (1981–1982).
51. Id. § 53.12(1). Under this provision, good conduct time was earned at a rate of one
day for each six days of above-average diligence. Id.
52. See id. § 973.01(1).
53. Id. § 57.06(1).
54. Id. § 939.50(3).
55. Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America, 1975–2025, in 42 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 141, 151–52 (Michael Tonry ed., 2013).
56. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 404, 411–12, 449–52.
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simply incapable of reliably rehabilitating criminals through the
progressive model of individualized evaluation and treatment.57
In response to these criticisms, five states eliminated discretionary
parole between 1975 and 1983.58 Wisconsin’s Legislature gave serious
consideration to doing the same in 1980, but a bill to that effect was
ultimately defeated by conservatives who were holding out for
something even tougher.59
Wisconsin reformers proved more successful in 1984, perhaps aided
by a temporary abatement of tough-on-crime politics in the state.60 The
state first adopted voluntary sentencing guidelines for judges, which
were intended to reduce disparities in punishment while preserving
judicial sentencing discretion.61 Then, just two weeks later, Democratic
Governor Anthony Earl signed into law new restrictions on parole.62 As
with the sentencing guidelines bill, liberal Democratic Representative
David Travis served as lead sponsor of the parole legislation,63 which
reflected the Left’s process-based critique of the old indeterminate
system more than the Right’s toughness agenda. The new law included
three key features: (1) corrections officials could no longer hold inmates
until the end of their imposed sentences, but were now required to
release inmates on parole no later than the two-thirds mark of the
sentence (the “mandatory release date”);64 (2) corrections officials were
now required to hold inmates until they had reached at least the onequarter mark of the sentence or six months, whichever was greater;65
and (3) prisoners in state custody lost the ability to earn good conduct
time.66

57. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 168–70 (1975).
58. Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, in 26 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 479, 496 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999).
59. See WIS. FELONY SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM., REPORT OF THE WISCONSIN
FELONY SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMITTEE 11–12 (1983) (noting that bill to eliminate
parole was defeated and replaced with bill calling for new mandatory minimum sentences).
60. See id. at 13 (noting that sentencing was not a decisive issue in gubernatorial or
legislative races in 1982 and that debate over sentencing discretion had “abated”).
61. WIS. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STAFF, INFORMATION MEMORANDUM 84-4: THE
FELONY SENTENCING GUIDELINES LAW 9–10 (1984).
62. Act of May 10, 1984, 1983 Wis. Act 528, 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws 2104.
63. Id. (parole reform); Act of April 25, 1984, 1983 Wis. Act 371, 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws
1625 (guidelines).
64. 1983 Wis. Act 528, § 2, 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws at 2105.
65. Id. § 18, 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws at 2107.
66. Id. § 2, 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws at 2105.
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These changes established a new system that might be fairly labeled
“moderate indeterminacy.” For instance, in the new system, an offender
sentenced by a judge to twelve years in prison might get out any time
between three years and eight years. Although such a sentence still had
considerable indeterminacy, the new system nonetheless contrasted
markedly with the old, in which the same sentence might have resulted
in any amount of time in prison up to twelve years.
C. Hyper-Determinacy, 1999–2009
Wisconsin’s system of moderate indeterminacy proved much less
durable than the prior system of hyper-indeterminacy. The sentencing
regime adopted in 1984 was doomed by a decade-long spike in violent
crime; a related, massive increase in the size of the state’s prison
population; and an intensification of political partisanship in the area of
penal policy.
As indicated in Figure 1, Wisconsin’s violent crime rate increased
sharply between 1960 and 1980, temporarily leveled off in the early
1980s, and then climbed to a new peak in 1995—a peak that was nearly
ten times higher than the 1963 valley. Chronically high levels of violent
crime in the 1990s helped to fuel public distrust of the criminal justice
system and provided the impetus for a plethora of new tough-on-crime
laws.67
Even without an increase in toughness, a surge in violent crime
would have produced a surge in imprisonment, and that is precisely
what Wisconsin experienced. As indicated in Figure 2, Wisconsin’s
imprisonment rate grew every single year from 1972 through 2003, and
then hit an all-time high in 2006, reaching a level more than nine times
that of the early 1970s. Such explosive growth pushed Wisconsin’s
prison system into a position of chronic overcrowding, even
notwithstanding an extraordinary prison-building boom.68

67. See, e.g., Act of April 13, 1994, 1993 Wis. Act 281, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 1087; Act of
December 10, 1993, 1993 Wis. Act 97, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 637; Act of August 3, 1989, 1989
Wis. Act 31, 1989 Wis. Sess. Laws 54.
68. In 1974, Wisconsin’s prison population was below the state’s total designed bed
capacity, but by 1982 the population had grown to 120% of capacity. See WIS. DIV. OF
CORR., FISCAL YEAR SUMMARY REPORT OF POPULATION MOVEMENT, at tbl.1 (1974); WIS.
LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, ADULT AND JUVENILE CORRECTIONS PROGRAMS, at
Attachment II (1983). Beds increased by more than 50% in the next decade, but the system
only fell further behind; by 1992, the prison population was nearly 130% of capacity. WIS.
DEP’T OF CORR., FISCAL YEAR SUMMARY OF POPULATION MOVEMENT, at tbl.1 (1992).

2014]

GOOD CONDUCT TIME

499

Figure 1
Wisconsin violent crime per 100,000 residents, 1960–201069
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69. “Violent crime” refers here to the four violent “index” crimes tracked by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation: homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. The data
come from the FBI’s annual reports entitled Crime in the United States, which are available
back to 1995. Uniform Crime Reports, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/ab
out-us/cjis/ucr/ucr (last visited Nov. 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/97ML-Y7SD. Older
reports are available online from LLMC Digital. LAW LIB. MICROFORM CONSORTIUM,
http://www.llmcdigital.org/titleresults.aspx?searchtype=0&set=80524&volume=&part=&page
(last visited Nov. 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4AF-436K.
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Figure 2
Wisconsin imprisonment per 100,000, 1972–201170
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0

70. “Imprisonment” here refers only to those incarcerated persons sentenced to prison
and does not include those incarcerated in local jails. Older data come from PATRICK A.
LANGAN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS ON PRISONERS IN STATE
AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS, YEAREND 1925–86 (1988). More recent data come from the
Bureau of Justice Statistics’ annual Prisoners reports. Publications & Products: Prisoners,
BUREAU JUST. STAT., http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbse&sid=40 (last visited Nov. 7,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/99VG-H6XT.
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Fortunately for the new Department of Corrections (DOC), which
was carved out of the Department of Health and Social Services in
1990,71 a few safety valves were available to prevent a complete system
meltdown. One such safety valve was the Intensive Sanctions Program
(ISP), created by the Legislature in 1991 to address overcrowding by
establishing an intermediate option between prison and regular parole
supervision.72 Through the early and mid-1990s, the DOC released
hundreds of inmates to the ISP each year, and used the ISP as an
alternative to revocation for even greater numbers of probationers and
parolees.73 However, the DOC was criticized for failing to screen and
supervise ISP participants adequately.74 Eventually, in 1997, an ISP
participant was arrested for a double-homicide, which provoked a
political and media firestorm, with leading Democrats trying to pin the
responsibility on Republican Governor Tommy Thompson.75
But the most important safety valve, by far, was discretionary
parole—even in its constrained, post-1984 form. An absence of
objective parole criteria meant that the DOC’s Parole Commission had
considerable freedom to liberalize release in times of prison
overcrowding.76 And, sure enough, as prison admissions exploded in the
1990s, the parole safety valve was soon opened wide, and it became
almost unheard of for Wisconsin inmates to remain in prison until their
mandatory release dates.77 As a result of this liberalization, the average
prison time served before release dropped by seven percent between
1990 and 1998, even though the average prison sentence increased by

71. Act of August 3, 1989, 1989 Wis. Act 31, § 3023, 1989 Wis. Sess. Laws 54, 697.
72. TOMMY G. THOMPSON, POWER TO THE PEOPLE: AN AMERICAN STATE AT WORK
183–84 (1996).
73. INTENSIVE SANCTIONS REVIEW PANEL, FINAL REPORT: SUBMITTED TO
GOVERNOR TOMMY G. THOMPSON 7 (1998).
74. Id. at 3.
75. Jim Stingl, Suspect Triggered 158 Alerts, Log Shows, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Aug. 28, 1997, at 1B.
76. Patrick J. Fiedler, The Wisconsin Department of Corrections: An Expensive
Proposition, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 501, 513–15 (1993).
77. In 1990, more than forty percent of the males released from prison in Wisconsin
were required to wait until their mandatory release date, but in 1991, that figure dropped to
less than thirty percent, and in 1992, to less than fifteen percent. WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL
BUREAU, INFORMATION PAPER #53: ADULT CORRECTIONS PROGRAM 6 tbl.III (1993).
Mandatory releases eventually dropped below ten percent in 1994 and remained low through
the mid-1990s. WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, INFORMATION PAPER #54: ADULT
CORRECTIONS PROGRAM 11 tbl.4 (1997).
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eight percent in the same time period.78 As these trends became
publicized, parole, like the ISP, became a lightning rod of controversy.79
Even Governor Thompson, who was in a sense responsible for the
liberalization of parole,80 recognized that early release for prisoners cut
against the grain of tough-on-crime politics, which were intensifying
considerably in the 1990s.81 Running for reelection in 1994, Thompson
himself vowed to end parole for violent criminals.82 Thompson’s
principal political rival, Democratic Attorney General Jim Doyle, then
picked up the “truth in sentencing” call and was first out of the blocks
with a specific reform proposal in 1996.83 Doyle’s proposal, however,
followed the lead of most TIS jurisdictions in maintaining some
indeterminacy; the Attorney General would have permitted inmates to
earn GCT and thereby obtain release as early as the eighty-five percent
mark of their sentences.84
Although Doyle’s GCT proposal was far less generous than the pre1984 system, which permitted day-for-day credits for longer-serving
inmates,85 it became a target of ridicule from the Thompson camp.
Releasing prisoners after they serve just eighty-five percent of their
sentences, sniffed Thompson’s spokesman, is not truth in sentencing.86
The Doyle-Thompson rivalry, the partisan backlash against the
supposed softness and mismanagement of the ISP and parole, and a
sharp rightward tilt in the Legislature in the 1990s87 may have made

78. Mike Flaherty, Truth in Sentencing: End of Parole Could Jam Prisons, Boost
Budget, WIS. ST. J., Apr. 12, 1998, at 1A, available at 1998 WLNR 5462617.
79. See, e.g., John Welsh, Longer Sentences, Shorter Terms; Average Prison Stay in
Wisconsin Has Been Decreasing, State Journal Analysis Finds, WIS. ST. J., Mar. 15, 1998, at
1A, available at 1998 WLNR 5478707 (noting that Parole Chair was called “most dangerous
man in Wisconsin” by Kenosha County District Attorney).
80. The Parole Chairperson in a gubernatorial appointee. WIS. STAT. § 15.145(1)
(2011–2012).
81. See Tonry, supra note 55, at 150.
82. JOE FONTAINE, WIS. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCING POLICY IN WISCONSIN:
1975–2005, at 24 (2005).
83. Id. at 25.
84. O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 10).
85. Id.
86. Doyle Urges Halt to Early Releases; Report Shows Felons Are Serving Shorter
Sentences Than Six Years Ago, WIS. ST. J., Oct. 15, 1996, at 3B, available at 1996 WLNR
4488619.
87. Democrats controlled both legislative chambers in the 1980s, but Republicans took
the Senate in 1993 and the Assembly in 1995. WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU,
2011–2012 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 256 (2011).
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inevitable that the final version of TIS, adopted in 1998,88 would be
harsher and more rigid than either Doyle or Thompson had initially
proposed. In contrast to Thompson’s initial campaign promise, the final
TIS law was not limited to violent criminals.89 And, in contrast to
Doyle’s proposal, the final law made no allowance for good conduct
time.90 Moreover, the law also included a fifty percent, across-the-board
increase in maximum sentences.91
The arguments for TIS advanced by Doyle, Thompson, and other
proponents sounded three distinct themes. First, proponents argued
that TIS would reduce crime by giving prison sentences a stronger
deterrent force and by incapacitating dangerous offenders for longer
periods of time.92 Second, proponents argued that TIS advanced
democratic values by shifting power over punishment from the
unelected members of the Parole Commission to the state’s elected
judiciary.93 Finally, proponents also framed TIS as a victims’ rights
measure; it was said that victims would benefit from having greater
certainty as to the release dates of their offenders.94
The first argument simply perpetuated the Right’s longstanding
critique of parole as too lenient. The second two in some respects
echoed the Left’s process-oriented critique of parole in the 1970s, but
with a focus on the interests of victims and voters, rather than on those
of offenders. Missing from the public discussion seemed to be any of the
humanitarian, reintegrationist sensibilities that had propelled the
creation of the indeterminate system in the nineteenth century.
In any event, when the TIS law took effect in 1999,95 Wisconsin
abruptly moved from a system of moderate indeterminacy to one of
hyper-determinacy. A state fiscal crisis shortly thereafter and related
88. Act of June 15, 1998, 1997 Wis. Act 283, 1997 Wis. Sess. Laws 2096.
89. O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 11).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (manuscript at 14).
93. Id. (manuscript at 12–13).
94. For instance, a leading supporter in the Senate argued, “Our current system of
penalizing and imprisoning people is a fraud perpetrated on the victims . . . . We’ve probably
all heard . . . the stories from district attorneys that tell us there’s no way they can tell a victim
how long somebody will be behind bars . . . .” Richard P. Jones, Senate Easily Passes Bill to
End Parole: It Would Take Effect in ‘99, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 2, 1998, at 1A,
available at 1998 WLNR 5756084 (quoting Senator Joanne Huelsman) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
95. Act of June 15, 1998, 1997 Wis. Act 283, § 456, 1997 Wis. Sess. Laws 2096, 2412–43.
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concerns over the DOC’s burgeoning budget helped to motivate some
softening of the new regime in 2002.96 However, the system’s hyperdeterminacy remained largely intact. Although the 2002 law created
new opportunities for judges to modify sentences,97 there was no reason
to think that this would become a routine feature of penal practice, as
parole and good conduct time had once been. Indeed, one study found
an almost laughably low success rate of 0.8% for sentence modification
petitions in three of the state’s largest counties (Milwaukee, Racine, and
Kenosha).98
D. Moderate Determinacy, 2009–2011
Although more extreme than in other states, Wisconsin’s turn to
hyper-determinacy was part of a broader national trend in the 1990s.
Indeed, one study determined that forty-two states had TIS laws in place
by the end of the decade.99 As with the earlier wave of parole reforms in
the 1970s and 1980s, the new TIS laws reflected continuing public
frustration with historically high rates of violent crime, a loss of
confidence in the effectiveness of rehabilitative programming, and a
mistrust of criminal justice professionals100 (albeit without much of the
due-process and equal-protection orientation of the first wave).
As the 1990s gave way to the 2000s, the national pendulum seemed
to swing back in the opposite direction. In part, this resulted from state
fiscal crises associated with the recessions of 2001 and 2007–2009, which
forced many states to consider whether they could really afford all of the

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 16–18).
See Norris, supra note 14, at 1566, 1613.
Id. at 1583 n.149.
SABOL ET AL., supra note 5, at 7.
See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN,
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 159–
60, 173–74 (2001) (discussing impact of chronic fear of crime and politics of mistrust of
government on penal policies in the 1990s). This is not to say that, in adopting TIS, American
policymakers simply followed public preferences in a straightforward, unproblematic way.
For instance, much research establishes that political and media elites play an important role
in fanning public fear of crime. MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND
SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 37 (2004). Additionally, political and media
elites can also define the range of policy responses that are on the table for public discussion.
There is no reason, for example, to think that Wisconsin adopted the nation’s most extreme
TIS law because Wisconsin voters had uniquely strong views about TIS. Rather, hyperdeterminacy resulted from a series of calculated decisions made by Wisconsin’s political elites
that were not made by the political elites in other states.
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tough-on-crime measures that had been adopted in the 1990s.101 In part,
the determinacy pendulum reversed course because the rehabilitation
pendulum also reversed course: the “nothing works” mantra of the
1970s and 1980s was replaced with a new hope that more rigorously
“evidence-based” approaches would yield significant reductions in
recidivism rates.102 Increased confidence in rehabilitation, in turn,
promotes increased acceptance of flexible penal systems that are
designed to encourage and reward rehabilitative progress—much as
happened in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Finally,
with crime rates going through a period of sustained decline,103 public
concern over crime and general punitiveness also dropped.104 Consistent
with these changes, national opinion surveys began to reveal high levels
of public support for alternatives to incarceration.105 Little wonder,
then, that a good three-dozen states adopted new early release
opportunities for prisoners between 2000 and 2010.106
Wisconsin came late to the party. Finally, in 2009, the state adopted
significant changes to its system of hyper-determinacy. Jim Doyle, now
serving as Governor, pushed through the Democratic Legislature a
complicated set of reforms that, in a sense, recreated parole and good
conduct time with new names.107 Some of the important features
included: (1) creation of new opportunities for early release based on
good behavior in prison (“positive adjustment time”), amounting to as
much as one-third off the prison term;108 (2) transfer of authority over
sentence-adjustment from the judiciary to a new Earned Release
Review Commission (ERRC);109 (3) expansion of “compassionate
release,” which permitted release by the ERRC for inmates based on

101. See, e.g., Daniel F. Wilhelm & Nicholas R. Turner, Is the Budget Crisis Changing
the Way We Look at Sentencing and Incarceration?, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 41 (2002).
102. Roger K. Warren, The Most Promising Way Forward: Incorporating EvidenceBased Practice into State Sentencing and Corrections Policies, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 322, 322
(2008).
103. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE, at v (2007).
104. PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCS. INT’L FOR THE NAT’L CTR FOR STATE
COURTS, THE NSCS SENTENCING ATTITUDES SURVEY: A REPORT ON THE FINDINGS 13
(2006); Mark D. Ramirez, Punitive Sentiment, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 337 (2013).
105. O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 35–39).
106. Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate
Sentencing, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1247, 1248 (2011).
107. O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 18–20).
108. Norris, supra note 14, at 1574–75.
109. Id. at 1572–74.
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terminal illness or other qualifying medical conditions;110 and (4)
authority for the DOC to release certain inmates who were within one
year of their original release dates.111 Public defenses of these reforms
focused on their capacity to save corrections costs and on the need to
provide better incentives for good behavior and rehabilitative effort.112
Although these changes moved Wisconsin away from hyperdeterminacy, they fell far short of a return to the moderate
indeterminacy of 1984–1999, and are probably better characterized as a
new regime of moderate determinacy. In the pre-TIS system (moderate
indeterminacy), nearly all inmates qualified for release at the onequarter mark of the sentence; in comparison to the mandatory release
date (two-thirds), this meant that inmates through good behavior and
generous treatment by the Parole Commission might knock off more
than sixty percent of the maximum time of imprisonment.113 By
contrast, the Doyle reforms seemed designed to reduce the period of
initial confinement by at most only about one-third—this was the
maximum benefit that could be earned through positive adjustment
time. Moreover, even this one-third reduction was limited to just the
least serious offenders (those convicted of nonviolent misdemeanors
and Class F through I felonies); more serious offenders qualified for
smaller reductions of twenty-five or fifteen percent, or none at all.114
Other aspects of the Doyle reforms were even more limited. For
instance, the ERRC could only provide sentence adjustment after
seventy-five or eighty-five percent of the prison term had been served,
depending on the seriousness of the offense.115
Republicans nonetheless wasted no time in castigating Doyle’s
proposal as a “complete gutting of truth in sentencing.”116 Echoing the
110. Id. at 1568–70.
111. Id. at 1576.
112. See, e.g., Steven Elbow, Doyle’s Vetoes Rankle Friends and Foes: Both Sides of the
Aisle Irked as Governor Strips Budget of Key Prison Release Terms, CAP. TIMES, July 8, 2009,
at 17, available at 2009 WLNR 13042629 (“Doyle’s earned release plan was presented last
spring as a way to chip away at a burgeoning prison population . . . .”); Mark Pitsch, Prisoner
Proposal Defended: Critic Says Plan Guts Sentence Law, WIS. ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A1,
available at 2009 WLNR 3327502 (“The proposal, unveiled Tuesday as part of the state’s
2009–11 budget, could save millions of dollars while also providing rehabilitation incentives to
prisoners, Corrections Secretary Rick Raemisch said.”).
113. O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 8); see also Norris, supra note
14, at 1574
114. Norris, supra note 14, at 1574.
115. Id. at 1573–74.
116. Pitsch, supra note 112 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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original arguments for TIS, opponents of Doyle’s plan invoked both
public-safety and democratic-accountability considerations. “We’re not
talking about Boy Scouts here,” said one Republican leader, “We’re
talking about some dangerous people that are going to be released.”117
Another observed, “With judges you have accountability . . . . Judges
are elected and they’re re-elected by the people. The nameless faceless
bureaucrats on this [ERRC] will be able to release whoever they want
with no accountability.”118
In 2009, Republicans could do little but complain. In 2010, however,
they swept to power in Madison, led by a new Governor, Scott
Walker.119 Since Walker expressly campaigned against the Doyle
reforms in his run for office,120 there should be little surprise that the
reforms were repealed in 2011.121 Supporters of the repeal bill reiterated
the same sorts of criticisms of early release that they had advanced in
2009. For instance, one leading Republican charged, “Early release has
allowed hundreds of high-risk inmates to get out of jail before serving
their time . . . and Wisconsin will undoubtedly be a safer place to live,
work and raise a family now that dangerous criminals will be kept
behind bars where they belong.”122 To such criticisms, though, was
added the charge that the Doyle reforms had not even proven much of a
money saver.123 In their first year, for instance, only 158 inmates were
released early, which fell far short of the 500 to 1,000 projected by
Doyle.124 If there was some irony in attacking early release as both too
reckless and too conservative, that irony was apparently lost on
Republicans, who effectively reinstated the system of hyperdeterminacy that prevailed from 1999 to 2009.

117. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id.
119. Norris, supra note 14, at 1567.
120. Id.
121. See WIS. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ACT MEMO: 2011 WIS. ACT 38, REPEAL OF
EARLY RELEASE (2011), available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lc/publications/act/2011/act038
-sb057.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/XQU3-TGAP.
122. Liam Marlaire, Walker Signs Bill Ending Early Release Program, LEADERTELEGRAM, July 20, 2011, http://www.leadertelegram.com/news/front_page/article_28a5448363d1-5197-ad70-6f255a35fa8d.html, archived at http://perma.cc/S4YB-3DH6 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
123. Id.
124. Ben Poston, Sentencing Reform Results Fall Short: Early Prison Releases, Cost
Saving Are a Fraction of Year-Ago Estimate, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 10, 2010, at 1A,
available at 2010 WLNR 13920379.
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E. Hyper-Determinacy: Destination or Detour?
One question raised by the foregoing history is whether Wisconsin is
on a policy trajectory that will always lead back to hyper-determinacy.
Put differently, do the rejections of moderate indeterminacy in 1998 and
of moderate determinacy in 2011 demonstrate that any meaningful
degree of indeterminacy is a political non-starter in Wisconsin?
For at least four reasons, I do not think the history supports such a
conclusion. First, taking the long view, Wisconsin has had parole and
good conduct time for the vast majority of its existence as a state. From
the wider historical perspective, hyper-determinacy remains little more
than a short-term experiment; its lifespan has still been no longer than
that of the moderate indeterminacy system set up in 1984. The
extraordinary dynamism—the constant churning of new waves of
reform—that has marked sentencing and corrections policy nationally125
and in Wisconsin126 since 1970 should make us very hesitant to view any
given aspect of current policy as set in stone. Such hesitancy should be
especially strong as to aspects of policy that cut against penal practices
that, until relatively recently, were accepted by Wisconsinites with little
apparent controversy.
Second, the history demonstrates that Wisconsin normally remains
within the national mainstream of sentencing and corrections policy.
Wisconsin adopted good conduct time and parole in the nineteenth
century at about the same time that most other states did so. Similarly,
a century later, Wisconsin imposed new constraints on indeterminacy in
the same era that many other states were also taking action to bring
more uniformity and due process to their sentencing and corrections
systems. Then, when Wisconsin adopted its TIS law in 1998, it was
riding a wave that rolled over more than forty other states (albeit with
less extreme results). Likewise, when Wisconsin adopted its 2009 early
release reforms, it was taking part in a widespread national trend. The
2011 repeal put Wisconsin back in an outlier position, but the state’s
general tendency to move in sync with national trends in this area
suggests that the current regime will not likely last indefinitely. Many
other states are reaping significant financial gains from softening the
harsh penal systems that were developed in the 1990s, and are doing so

125. Tonry, supra note 55.
126. See, e.g., O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 5–21) (describing
waves of reform in Wisconsin since 1990).
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without any apparent adverse effect on crime rates.127 There is nothing
in Wisconsin’s history to suggest that it will prove an obstinate holdout
against reforms that are generally embraced elsewhere.
Third, in retrospect, it is easy to see that the adoption of hyperdeterminacy in 1998 resulted less from a sudden recognition of certain
timeless principles of justice or a playing out of the inherent logic of
crime control, than from the confluence of various circumstances that
were specific to the mid- and late 1990s, or perhaps somewhat more
broadly to the latter portion of the twentieth century—circumstances
that are no longer present, or at least not to the same degree. As
indicated in Figure 1, rates of violent crime in the state have stabilized
or dropped since the long period of nearly constant increases between
the mid-1960s and mid-1990s. As indicated in Figure 2, rates of
imprisonment have stabilized or dropped since the long period of nearly
constant increases between the mid-1970s and the mid-2000s. These
increases threatened to overwhelm Governor Thompson’s DOC, and as
the agency struggled to cope, Democrats tried to use its difficulties for
partisan political advantage—a strategy that exacerbated the
politicization of sentencing policy in the 1990s and sharpened the
partisan competition over who could be toughest on crime. At the same
time, confidence in rehabilitation may have been at a singularly low ebb
in the 1990s; the past decade, by contrast, has witnessed a proliferation
of drug courts and other treatment-oriented initiatives in Wisconsin,
many of which have been funded by the state’s growing Treatment
Alternatives Diversion grant program.128
Fourth, and finally, although current conditions are much closer to
those of 2011 than to those of 1998, there are also good reasons to doubt
that the repeal of the Doyle reforms in 2011 represented some sort of
definitive repudiation of indeterminacy. Repeal swiftly followed the
election of Governor Scott Walker and new Republican legislative
majorities in 2010—electoral results that probably had much less to do
with criminal justice policies than with a broader national backlash

127. See, e.g., COUNCIL FOR STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., LESSONS FROM THE
STATES: REDUCING RECIDIVISM AND CURBING CORRECTIONS COSTS THROUGH JUSTICE
REINVESTMENT (2013), available at http://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/FI
NAL_State_Lessons_mbedit.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/H3AK-LXVC.
128. See UNIV. OF WIS. POPULATION HEALTH INST., TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES
AND DIVERSION (TAD) PROGRAM: PARTICIPANT OUTCOME EVALUATION AND COSTBENEFIT REPORT (2007−2013), at 1 (2014), available at https://uwphi.pophealth.wisc.edu/abo
ut/staff/van-stelle-kit/tad-2014-outcomes-report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J6JR-479H.
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against President Obama and his health-care reforms, as well as
unhappiness with a chronically sluggish economy.129 Indeed, it is hard to
see the repeal as anything but the byproduct of an extraordinary and
perhaps unprecedented surge in partisanship in Madison in the 2009–
2011 time period.130 A Democratic Governor pushed reforms through a
Democratic Legislature; then, when Republicans took control of state
government, they promptly pushed through a repeal of the same
reforms before they had been in place long enough to prove themselves.
This smacks more of knee-jerk partisanship than reasoned policy choice,
especially in light of the seemingly inconsistent criticisms that the
reforms were both too conservative and too reckless.131 Certainly, the
survey data discussed in Part IV below belie any suggestion that
Wisconsin voters share the inflexible stance on TIS that was embodied
in the repeal.
III. THE DUBIOUS CASE FOR HYPER-DETERMINACY
As indicated in Part II, there have been essentially three arguments
advanced for hyper-determinacy in Wisconsin. Each of the three has
some force, but they do not persuasively dictate such an extreme policy
as Wisconsin has. Each is considered in more detail below. For present
purposes, I am particularly interested in exploring the extent to which
good conduct time may be reconciled with the basic normative values
that underwrite hyper-determinacy.
A. Democratic Accountability
Sentencing judges in Wisconsin are elected, while members of the
Parole Commission and Earned Release Review Commission have not
been.132 This difference in democratic accountability has led to
arguments that judges are more appropriate decision makers when it

129. See, e.g., Craig Gilbert, River of Red Buries the Blue, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/106589258.html, archived at http://per
ma.cc/7REN-DGNY (noting that the economy was “overwhelmingly the top concern” of
Wisconsin voters in 2010 and that “Republican[s] made gains across the board” in Midwest).
130. See, e.g., James B. Kelleher, Up to 100,000 Protest Wisconsin Law Curbing Unions,
REUTERS, Mar. 12, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/13/us-wisconsinprotests-idUSTRE72B2AN20110313, archived at http://perma.cc/4SQM-B6CS (describing
flight of Democrat senators to Illinois).
131. See supra Part II.D.
132. See Act of June 29, 2009, 2009 Wis. Act 28, § 34, 2009 Wis. Sess. Laws 179, 185.
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comes to punishment than appointed commissioners.133 There may
indeed be some symbolic and practical value to giving locally elected
judges some say over punishment, which promotes the perception, and
perhaps also to some extent the reality, that punishment is grounded in
the particular needs and values of the community most directly harmed
by the offense.134 Even granting this value, however, the democratic
accountability argument does not provide strong support for hyperdeterminacy. The argument suffers from at least four flaws.
First, the argument exaggerates the differences in the democratic
accountability of judges and commissioners. On the one hand, local
judicial elections have notoriously low turnouts and offer little useful
information to aid voters’ decisions.135 As to sentencing specifically, a
few cases in a judge’s career may generate substantial media coverage,
but the vast majority of a judge’s sentencing decisions fly well below the
public’s radar screen. Democratic accountability for these decisions is
far more theoretical than actual. On the other hand, while appointed
commissioners may not face elections themselves, they are accountable
to Governors, who are much more likely to experience a closely
contested, closely covered, high-turnout race than is a trial-court judge.
While the democratic accountability of commissioners may be indirect,
it is real, and it sometimes affects practice in important ways. For
instance, after the high rate of parole grants in Wisconsin became a
matter of public controversy in the 1990s, the grant rate dropped

133. See, e.g., James E. Doyle, Wisconsin Needs “Truth in Sentencing,” 20 WIS. BAR
CRIM. L. NEWS 17, 18 (1997); Pitsch, supra note 112.
134. I develop an argument along these lines in Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review
of Sentences: Reconsidering Deference, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2123, 2152–55 (2010).
135. See, e.g., Diane S. Sykes, The State of Judicial Selection in Wisconsin, MARQ. LAW.,
Spring 2009, at 64, 69 (“Judicial campaigns in Wisconsin have historically suffered from a
different sort of problem: Most were low-interest affairs in which the candidates had
relatively modest budgets and limited opportunities to communicate with voters about their
qualifications, experience, and judicial philosophy. The media paid little attention. . . . It
could reasonably be argued that these old-style judicial elections provided so little
information to the voting public as to make judicial elections nothing more than meaningless
contests about name recognition.”). Although elections for the Wisconsin Supreme Court
have become much better-financed in recent years, id., local judicial elections remain quiet
affairs. For instance, in 2012, Milwaukee County elected ten Circuit Court judges, eight of
whom ran unopposed. WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, 2013–2014 WISCONSIN
BLUE BOOK 877 (2013). The highest vote total for any of the twelve candidates was less than
85,000. Id. By contrast, later in 2012, President Barack Obama won more than 332,000 votes
in Milwaukee County. Id. at 920. Even Republican candidate Mitt Romney, who lost badly
in Milwaukee County, received almost twice as many votes as the biggest judicial winner. Id.
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precipitously.136 To be sure, parole boards more commonly go about
their business without much media scrutiny, but that is no different than
the experience of the average trial-court judge.
Second, the local accountability of judges is a two-edged sword.
While local communities undoubtedly have a legitimate interest in the
way that crime is punished, so, too, does the state as a whole. After all,
it is the state that promulgates the criminal code, the state in whose
name a prosecution is conducted, and the state that will implement (and
pay for) the sentence that is handed down. The state may quite
appropriately wish to avoid wide county-to-county disparities in
sentences imposed for the same crime and also to ensure that limited
state correctional resources, particularly prison beds, are put to their
best crime-reducing use. Locally accountable judges, however, have
little incentive to prioritize such legitimate statewide interests. Indeed,
there is even something of a free-rider problem in the disjunction
between who imposes and who pays for a prison sentence: to local
judges, state prisons are essentially a free resource, and, as with any free
resource, we can expect this one to be over utilized.137
Third, while some democratic accountability is properly viewed as
an important source of legitimacy in our American governmental
system, such accountability is not an absolute value that trumps all else
in all situations. The fact that an official decision maker faces the voters
from time to time may be sufficient to give some legitimacy to that
official’s decisions, but it is not necessary. Rather, our governmental
system is premised on checks and balances involving diverse official
actors whose legitimacy is grounded in different ways. Federal judges,
for instance, get their legitimacy not from direct democratic
accountability, but from the appointment and confirmation process and
from observance of the procedural and jurisprudential principles that
give judicial decision making its distinctive character. Likewise, the
heads of executive agencies do not, in general, face the voters
themselves, but gain legitimacy by virtue of their accountability to

136. See WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, INFORMATIONAL PAPER #55: ADULT
CORRECTIONS PROGRAM 6 (2001) (noting that 75% of male first releases from prison were
to discretionary parole in 1997–1998, but only 33.5% in 1999–2000).
137. In theory, appellate review might help to ensure that locally elected sentencing
judges attend to statewide interests, but in practice appellate courts across the country have
almost uniformly resisted such a role. O’Hear, supra note 134, at 2125. Wisconsin is no
exception. Michael M. O’Hear, Appellate Review of Sentence Explanations: Learning From
the Wisconsin and Federal Experiences, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 762–76 (2009).
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elected chief executives and legislators, their observance of due process,
and their subject-matter expertise.
Indeed, to claim that punishment should be exclusively in the hands
of democratically accountable officials proves far too much. This would
require, for instance, that the Secretary of Corrections and all of his
prison wardens should also be elected, for the myriad decisions they
make about the quality of the prisoner’s experience—in what institution
is the prisoner housed, how the prisoner is disciplined for rules
infractions, how much contact the prisoner is allowed with family
members, what rehabilitative programming and employment
opportunities are made available, how much protection is provided from
sexual abuse, and so forth—seem no less consequential than decisions
about the quantity of time served. Once it is conceded that appointed
officials may properly make some of the state’s most important
decisions relating to punishment, there is no obvious reason why they
should be categorically excluded from the one particular decision of
release date. Rather, it seems more natural to think that this decision,
like so many others in our governmental system, should be subject to
checks and balances involving multiple decision makers, each with their
own strengths and weaknesses.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly in the present context,
however strong one’s doubts that a parole commission can be reconciled
with basic democratic values, such doubts have little relevance to good
conduct time. As structured in Wisconsin before 1984 and in my
proposal in this Essay, good conduct time simply does not involve the
same sort of exercise of official discretion that has been associated with
parole. Rather, GCT credits are awarded in an automatic, formulaic
way based on the relatively objective facts of a prisoner’s good conduct.
The formula is dictated by the democratically accountable legislature.
Although underlying disciplinary decisions may embody some exercise
of official discretion, the effect of these disciplinary decisions on an
inmate’s release date is much less direct and consequential than a parole
commission’s exercise of its plenary power over release.
In sum, democratic values do not clearly preclude even a traditional
parole commission, and much less do they rule out a system of good
conduct time.
B. Victim Rights
It is easy to see why some victims might object to indeterminacy.
Some may feel it important to their recovery for the legal system to
provide immediate, clear, definitive answers to their questions about
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what exactly will be done to their victimizers. Some may feel that any
lenience shown to an offender symbolically devalues the wrongfulness
of the offense and their experience of victimization. Some may wish to
take precautions before their victimizer is released and find it
inconvenient—or even terrifying in some cases—not to know well in
advance when the release will occur. Some risk serious trauma through
an unexpected encounter with their offender on the outside.
These are all very legitimate concerns and should be taken seriously
by policymakers.138 Indeed, in light of these concerns, I would not favor
a return to a general system of hyper-indeterminacy.
Yet, there remain at least three reasons not to go to the opposite
extreme of hyper-determinacy in all cases.
First, and most
fundamentally, the criminal-justice system primarily exists to serve
public interests, not the preferences of private victims. Publicly
accountable prosecutors may decide whether and how to charge and
plea-bargain cases independently of victim preferences. Judges may
receive victim impact statements at sentencing, but are not bound by the
victim’s penal recommendations.139 The system can and should try to
support victim recovery, but this has never been thought a singular,
overriding objective to the detriment of all other public interests.
Second, while many victims undoubtedly wish to maximize
determinacy, this is not the situation facing all, and perhaps not even
most, of the offenders sent to prison. For instance, in Wisconsin, more
than fifty-seven percent of the men admitted to prison in 2011 and 2012
were sent there for one of the following reasons: operating while
intoxicated, drug offenses, bail jumping/escape, or otherwise violating
conditions of community supervision.140 In such cases, it is often not

138. Survey results confirm that Wisconsin voters care about victim interests. In a July
2014 poll of registered voters in the state, more than eighty-one percent said that it was “very
important” or “absolutely essential” for the criminal justice system to keep victims informed
about their cases and help them to understand how the system works. MARQ. UNIV. LAW
SCH. POLL, MARQUETTE LAW SCHOOL POLL —JULY 17–20, 2014, at Q28b (2014)
[hereinafter 2014 TOPLINES], available at http://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2
014/07/MLSP22Toplines.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QMV6-FCAK.
139. See WIS. STAT. § 972.14(3)(a) (2011–2012).
140. WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, INFORMATIONAL PAPER 56: ADULT
CORRECTIONS PROGRAM 41 (2013). Note that my figure includes those in the “unsentenced”
category, which “generally includes admissions to the prison system of individuals who are
alleged to have violated their probation, parole, or extended supervision, and offenders
serving time in prison as an alternative to the revocation of probation, parole, or extended
supervision.” Id. at 10.
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clear that there is any particular victim who has interests distinct from
those of the general public. Moreover, even in cases that do have
discrete, identifiable victims, it is important to remember that victim
experiences and preferences are far from monolithic, and may evolve
over time. Many property offenses, of course, are impersonal in nature
and involve corporate victims; here, concerns about emotional trauma
and affronts to human dignity seem out of place. Even individuals who
have been personally victimized may have attitudes that are not wholly
punitive;141 for instance, some may hope above all else that something
positive will come out of the terrible thing that has happened to them
and be quite open to indeterminate dispositions that support offender
rehabilitation and eventual reintegration into the community. In any
event, in light of the great diversity of victim experiences and
preferences, it would be a mistake in the name of victims to adopt a
uniform rule of hyper-determinacy for all cases. Governor Thompson’s
original proposal that TIS be limited to cases of violent crime142 seems
much closer to the mark, although even that may have been an unduly
rigid approach.
Third, and finally, the sorts of victim interests that are said to
support determinacy may be accommodated reasonably well within a
system of limited good conduct time. While we may easily appreciate
the consternation of the victim who is told, “Your offender may be
released at any time in the next twelve years,” it seems a very different
matter to say, “You may be confident that your offender will spend the
next eight years behind bars and possibly even an additional four
beyond that.” Concerns may be further mitigated if each interested
victim is provided with periodic updates regarding his offender’s accrual
or loss of good conduct time and current projected release date.143 This

141. See, e.g., Mark S. Umbreit, Betty Vos, Robert B. Coates & Elizabeth Lightfoot,
Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century: A Social Movement Full of Opportunities and
Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 271 (2005) (noting diversity of reasons given by victims for
participating in victim-offender mediation, including “to help the offender change behavior”).
142. See supra Part II.C.
143. The DOC already makes release date information available through its public
website. General Public-Offender Search, WIS. DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS, http://offender
.doc.state.wi.us/lop/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7MUM-CQ3Y.
The DOC also provides notification to registered victims of changes in inmate status through
its VOICE for Victims program. Notification Services, WIS. DEP’T CORRECTIONS,
http://doc.wi.gov/victim-resources/notification-services (last visited Nov. 8, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/552A-BWPV. There seems no reason that good conduct time information
could not be added to these services.
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kind of system would provide victims with ample opportunity to prepare
for release. It would also diminish the sense of an offense-denigrating
“early” release. Rather than an after-the-fact exercise in lenience, the
operation of good conduct time can and should be viewed as an integral
part of the sentence, with its purpose and parameters clearly laid out by
the judge in open court.144 If this were accomplished, any arguments
against GCT based on victim rights would lose most or all of their force.
C. Public Safety
Proponents of hyper-determinacy in Wisconsin have a curiously
equivocal stance when it comes to public safety. On the one hand, they
have not hesitated to play on public fears of violent predators. For
instance, when notorious child-killer Gerald Turner was paroled in the
late 1990s, Governor Thompson declared that this was “the best
example yet of why Wisconsin needs the truth in sentencing initiative
[he] proposed.”145 Similarly, critics of Governor Doyle asserted that his
2009 reforms allowed “hundreds of high-risk inmates to get out of
jail.”146 Yet, at other times, prominent TIS proponents like Scott
Walker have asserted, “Truth-in-sentencing wasn’t necessarily to make
sentences longer, it was to make them certain.”147 As a result of
concerns about the potential budgetary impact of TIS, proponents most
heavily emphasized the process values of democratic accountability and
finality for victims, and often downplayed claims of enhanced severity.148
Proponents liked to hold out the hope that judges would correct for the
loss of parole by proportionately reducing the length of their imposed
sentences.149 But, of course, if this happened, then the Gerald Turners
144. I have suggested some specific language judges might use in O’Hear, supra note 1,
at 225–26.
145. David Callender, Gov Talks Tough on Sentencing, CAP. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1998, at
1A, available at 1998 WLNR 2463935.
146. Marlaire, supra note 122.
147. Sarah Wyatt, Lawmakers at Odds Over Prison Time: Budget Bills Differ on Truth
in Sentencing, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 7, 2002, at 2B, available at 2002 WLNR
3626291 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. See, e.g., Matt Pommer, Huge Savings Claimed for “Truth in Sentencing,” but
Prison Expert Dickey Calls Numbers “Fiction,” CAP. TIMES, June 4, 1997, at 4A, available at
1997 WLNR 2411960 (quoting Scott Walker as saying, “While it’s still very debatable whether
truth in sentencing will require any additional money, how can you put a price tag on peace of
mind for victims and their families? It’s invaluable . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
149. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 78 (“Assembly Speaker Scott Jensen, R-Waukesha,
said costs shouldn’t rise too much because judges will adjust their sentences to match the
amount of time they believe criminals should actually serve in prison.”).
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of the world would not spend one extra day in prison under the new
regime.
In truth, there is no necessary relationship between determinacy and
severity, and hence no necessary relationship between determinacy and
public safety. There is nothing to stop judges from increasing or
decreasing their imposed sentences as determinacy is increased or
decreased so as to maintain a more-or-less constant level of
incapacitation for high-risk offenders, especially if indeterminacy
functions transparently within a relatively narrow range at the end of
the prison term.150
There are two potential wrinkles with the introduction of a new
good conduct time system, as I propose. First, if GCT is made available
to already-sentenced inmates, then the sentence cannot take account of
the possible credits. In light of this concern, as well as a deference to the
reasonable expectations of victims, the retroactivity of any new GCT
system should be strictly limited.
A second wrinkle is this: while judges could offset the anticipated
effect of GCT in most cases, they would not be able to do so in those
cases in which they would like the defendant to serve a maximum or
near-maximum prison term. Consider, for instance, an armed robber
with a long history of prior convictions. A judge might think that such a
defendant represents such a grave threat to public safety that he should
be incapacitated for as long as possible. The statutory maximum period
of initial confinement for armed robbery, a Class C felony,151 is twentyfive years.152 However, with the introduction of good conduct time, a
judge could no longer guarantee that the defendant would actually serve
twenty-five years before release; with maximum good conduct time, in
fact, the defendant might get out in sixteen years and eight months (that
is, two-thirds of twenty-five years).
This limitation should not be seen as a significant threat to public
safety. First, even with a potential one-third reduction, maximum
sentences in Wisconsin remain very high by any reasonable standard.
Indeed, in many cases these maximums still reflect the impact of the

150. See, e.g., Kevin A. Wright & Jeffrey W. Rosky, Too Early Is Too Soon: Lessons
from the Montana Department of Corrections Early Release Program, 10 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 881, 888 (2011) (noting that some Montana judges changed their sentencing
practices so as to make offenders ineligible for controversial early release program).
151. WIS. STAT. § 943.32(2) (2011–2012).
152. Id. § 973.01(2)(b)(3).
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across-the-board increases of 1998.153 Consider again the example of
more than sixteen years in prison for armed robbery. In most of the rest
of the world, sentences of even ten years in prison are exceedingly
rare.154 In Germany, fifteen years in prison is viewed as such a long time
that even life-sentenced inmates must be considered for release at that
point.155 Indeed, even in Wisconsin up to 1994, armed robbers were
subject to mandatory release at thirteen years and four months.156 If
anyone doubts that sixteen years in prison is likely to make a big
difference in the public-safety threat posed by a robber, they should
simply consider from their own life experiences the changes and
maturation that occur in most people between the ages of twenty-one
(the average age of sentenced armed robbers in Wisconsin157) and thirtyseven.158
Second, in high-risk cases, there is good likelihood that prison terms
can be lengthened through the application of special sentenceenhancement statutes or the use of consecutive sentences on multiple
counts. Indeed, the very consideration that would warrant a finding of
high risk—that is, repeated criminality—means that recidivism-based
enhancers are more likely to apply and that multiple counts are more
153. The Criminal Penalties Study Committee, which proposed the new penalty
classification scheme that was enacted in the 2002 TIS reform law, adopted as a general rule
that maximum initial terms of confinement should conform to mandatory release dates in the
pre-TIS system. CRIMINAL PENALTIES STUDY COMM., FINAL REPORT 21–22 (1999).
However, the Committee recommended upward adjustments to this baseline for many
crimes, including such important crimes as sexual assault, sexual assault of a child, and
robbery. Id. at 26–29.
154. See, e.g., Michel Tonry, Sentencing Reform in America, 1975–2025, at tbl.1.3
(2013) (unpublished manuscript, copy on file with author) (showing that sentences greater
than 120 months occur in no more than 1.1% of cases in seven western European nations).
155. Dirk van Zyl Smit, Outlawing Irreducible Life Sentences: Europe on the Brink?, 23
FED. SENT’G REP. 39, 40 (2010).
156. See WIS. STAT. § 943.32(2) (1993–1994) (classifying armed robbery as Class B
felony); Act of April 6, 1994, 1993 Wis. Act 194, § 9, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 919, 920 (raising
maximum for Class B felony from twenty to forty years). Under the old system of mandatory
release, supra Part II.B, an armed robber receiving the pre-1994 maximum sentence of twenty
years would have subject to mandatory release at the two-thirds mark of the sentence, or
thirteen years and four months.
157. BRENDA R. MAYRACK, WIS. SENTENCING COMM’N, RACE & SENTENCING IN
WISCONSIN: SENTENCE AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS ACROSS FIVE CRIMINAL
OFFENSE AREAS 24 (2007).
158. See, e.g., Catherine Lebel & Christian Beaulieu, Longitudinal Development of
Human Brain Wiring Continues from Childhood Into Adulthood, 31 J. NEUROSCIENCE
10937, 10943 (2011) (discussing MRI evidence of continued brain development of young
adults well into their twenties).
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likely to be available. Consider once again the armed robber. If he has
a prior felony conviction in the past five years, then his maximum term
of imprisonment would increase by six years.159 If he has two prior
convictions for armed robbery or any other “serious” felonies, then he
would be subject to a life term.160 Moreover, if he has a prior felony
conviction and carried a firearm in the present armed robbery, then he
would be guilty of another felony (felon in possession) for which he
would face the possibility of a consecutive sentence.161 Additional
counts and consecutive sentences might also be available for multiple
victims, for nonconsensual entry into a building in connection with the
robbery, for sexual assault in connection with the robbery, for injury to a
law enforcement officer in connection with the arrest, and in many other
plausible circumstances. Assuming that prosecutors make full use of the
charging tools available to them in the most serious cases, it should be
quite unusual for judges to be limited to a twenty-five-year sentence
(less good conduct time) when they reasonably believe that something
longer is required for public safety.
Third, it is important to bear in mind that the one-third reduction in
prison time is not automatic, but must be earned through good conduct.
For many high-risk inmates, the same characteristics that would make
them prone to criminality, e.g., impulse-control deficits, would also tend
to make disciplinary infractions more likely behind bars, and hence lead
to the denial or loss of GCT.162
159. WIS. STAT. § 939.62(1)–(2) (2011–2012).
160. Id. § 939.62(2m).
161. Id. § 941.29.
162. See Richard Tewksbury, David Patrick Connor & Andrew S. Denney, Disciplinary
Infractions Behind Bars: An Exploration of Importation and Deprivation Theories, 39 CRIM.
JUST. REV. 201, 202 (2014) (“Regardless of the violent or nonviolent nature of disciplinary
infractions, inmates engaging in any type of institutional misconduct are more likely to return
to a prison upon release.”). There has been some debate in the literature over whether there
is a relationship between a tendency to engage in serious criminal misconduct and a tendency
to violate low-level prison rules that prohibit behavior that would be lawful outside of prison.
SCOTT D. CAMP, GERALD G. GAES, NEAL P. LANGAN & WILLIAM G. SAYLOR, FED.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, THE INFLUENCE OF PRISONS ON INMATE MISCONDUCT: A
MULTILEVEL INVESTIGATION 5 (2003). However, recent research has found similarities
between inmates who commit serious infractions and inmates who commit low-level
infractions. Id. Additionally, a recent meta-analysis of sixty-eight studies of “what works” in
reducing violations of prison rules found that “programs that were most effective in reducing
prison misconducts also generated lower recidivism rates . . . in the community . . . .” Sheila
A. French & Paul Gendreau, Reducing Prison Misconducts: What Works!, 33 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 185, 210 (2006). The authors conclude that their analysis “reinforces the view that
prison misconduct behavior is a reasonable proxy for antisocial behavior in the
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Fourth, it is also important to bear in mind that release based on
good conduct time will not be to complete liberty in the community, but
to the period of “extended supervision” (ES) that must be served at the
end of a prison term under TIS.163 ES may include many conditions set
by the sentencing judge and the DOC,164 the violation of which could
result in a swift return to custody.165
Fifth, notwithstanding the operation of good conduct time, sexually
violent offenders—probably the group of offenders who inspire the
most intense public-safety concerns—would still be subject to indefinite
civil commitment upon their “release” from prison.166 Indeed, the state
has used this authority aggressively over the past two decades, with
hundreds of offenders institutionalized as “sexually violent persons” and
only seventy-five actually succeeding in ever obtaining discharge from
inpatient commitment.167
Sixth, as an additional safeguard, a new good-time program could
include an override feature permitting the DOC to continue to hold
inmates notwithstanding their good-time credits if there is some specific,
persuasive reason to think that their good conduct in prison is not
indicative of likely success in avoiding new offenses after release. A
determination to this effect might be based, for instance, on such
considerations as a significant, unaddressed, crimogenic mental health
issue, such as drug addiction; a failure to take advantage of work,
education, and programming opportunities in prison; and the absence of
a viable plan to obtain employment and housing after release. Such an
override feature should, of course, include appropriate procedural
safeguards and place a burden of proof on the DOC.
Seventh, and most fundamentally, the facile assumption that longer
incarceration means greater public safety must be rejected. As we’ve
moved beyond the “nothing works” era of the late twentieth century,168
community.” Id. In the same vein, a recent study of more than 16,000 released Minnesota
prisoners found that institutional discipline was a statistically significant predictor of
recidivism. Grant Duwe & Valerie Clark, Blessed Be the Social Tie That Binds: The Effects of
Prison Visitation on Offender Recidivism, 24 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 271, 272, 285 (2013).
163. WIS. STAT. § 973.01(2) (2011–2012).
164. Id. § 302.113(7).
165. Id. § 302.113(8m)–(9).
166. See generally WIS. STAT. ch. 980 (2011-2012).
167. WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU, INFORMATIONAL PAPER 54: CIVIL
COMMITMENT OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PERSONS 16–17 (2013).
168. See, e.g., WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC
POLICY OPTIONS TO REDUCE FUTURE PRISON CONSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS,
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Americans have increasingly come to recognize that the qualitative
dimensions of incarceration may be just as important as the quantitative
when it comes to public safety. In one recent survey, for instance, a full
eighty-seven percent of respondents, including eighty-five percent of
Republicans, agreed that “[i]t does not matter whether a non-violent
offender is in prison for 18 or 24 or 30 months . . . . What really matters
is that the system does a better job of making sure that when an
offender does get out, he is less likely to commit another crime.”169 A
GCT program can support the rehabilitative mission of the prison
system by giving prisoners more hope and more incentive to take
advantage of positive opportunities behind bars;170 by promoting
institutional security and order;171 and by facilitating the movement of
low-risk inmates out of prison, which can alleviate dangerous and
dispiriting overcrowding172 and save money that can then be reinvested
in expanded and improved programming for offenders. Indeed, across
the country, many states are now discovering that they can reduce
recidivism, and hence crime rates, through just such a “justice

AND CRIME RATES 1 (2006) (“We find that if Washington successfully implements a
moderate-to-aggressive portfolio of evidence-based options, a significant level of future
prison construction can be avoided, taxpayers can save about two billion dollars, and crime
rates can be reduced.”); French & Gendreau, supra note 162, at 189 (noting that empirical
literature on “what works” has identified certain principles of correctional treatment that
have produced “impressive reductions in recidivism”); Aaron Knapp, Shaving Off Time
Served: Officials Say Program Allowing Early Release from Prison Getting Results, J. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2013, at A1 (noting lower recidivism rates of Wisconsin prisoners who have gone
through state’s Earned Release Program than for eligible inmates who did not participate).
169. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, PUBLIC OPINION ON SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS
POLICY IN AMERICA 5 (2012) [hereinafter PEW 2012].
170. See, e.g., LYNNE GOODSTEIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DETERMINATE
SENTENCING AND THE CORRECTIONAL PROCESS: A STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
IMPACT OF SENTENCING REFORM IN THREE STATES —EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 37 (1984)
(noting increased program participation in Illinois prisons after implementation of new GCT
program that required program participation for full credit); Nora V. Demleitner, Good
Conduct Time: How Much and For Whom? The Unprincipled Approach of the Model Penal
Code: Sentencing, 61 FLA. L. REV. 777, 788 (2009) (noting “dramatic[]” increase in number of
inmates participating in federal drug abuse program after Congress changed law to permit a
one-year credit for successful completion).
171. See French & Gendreau, supra note 162, at 207 (discussing findings of metaanalyses that behavioral programs have proven effective in reducing prison misconducts);
Beth M. Huebner, Administrative Determinants of Inmate Violence: A Multilevel Analysis, 31
J. CRIM. JUST. 107, 109 (2003) (noting research showing that “inmates involved in educational
and vocational programming or work are less likely to assault prison staff or inmates”).
172. Some empirical research has found a relationship between crowding and inmate
misconduct. CAMP ET AL., supra note 162, at 22.
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reinvestment” strategy.173 With such experiences in mind, there is no
reason to assume that a significant overall reduction in incarceration—
which may or may not actually result from the implementation of a
good-time program174—would diminish public safety; indeed, just the
opposite may occur.175
IV. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR INDETERMINACY
AND GOOD CONDUCT TIME
Surveys in both Wisconsin and the nation as a whole reveal that
public attitudes toward sentencing are much less rigidly punitive than is
sometimes supposed. Indeed, large majorities reject hyper-determinacy
and favor more flexible approaches to prisoner release. In this Part, I
first summarize the Wisconsin data and then discuss complementary
national findings.
A. Support for Indeterminacy in Wisconsin
The Marquette University Law School Poll has conducted regular
telephone surveys of Wisconsin voters since 2012.176 The surveys of July
2012, July 2013, and July 2014 focused particularly on sentencing-related
issues and, as detailed below, produced remarkably consistent results.
The margin of error in each of these surveys was less than plus or minus
four percentage points.177
173. See generally COUNCIL FOR STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., supra note 127.
174. The national data make clear that indeterminacy provides no guarantee of reduced
imprisonment. Indeed, the most comprehensive studies have found that parole is associated
with higher, not lower, imprisonment rates. See Don Stemen & Andres F. Rengifo, Policies
and Imprisonment: The Impact of Structured Sentencing and Determinate Sentencing on State
Incarceration Rates, 1978–2004, 28 JUST. Q. 174, 190 (2011). However, GCT may operate
differently than other forms of indeterminacy in that it relies less centrally on official
discretion. Cf. id. at 194 (asserting that eliminating discretionary parole may lead to lower
imprisonment rates because doing so “insulates release decisions from politics, emotion, and
the social forces that may lead to higher incarceration rates over time”).
175. See Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Imprisonment and
Reoffending, in 38 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 115, 178 (Michael Tonry
ed., 2009) (“[A] key finding of our review is that the great majority of studies point to a null
or criminogenic effect of the prison experience on subsequent offending.”).
176. More information about the Poll is available through its website Marquette
University Law School Poll, MARQ. U. L. SCH. POLL, https://law.marquette.edu/poll/ (last
visited Nov. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/G8WS-4YX7.
177. Complete results and data from each survey can be found at Results & Data,
MARQ. U. L. SCH. POLL, https://law.marquette.edu/poll/results-data/ (last visited Nov. 8,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/LAH5-HGM3. The 2014 Poll was comprised of 804
Wisconsin registered voters. Methodology: Marquette University Law School Poll, July 2014,
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Although none of the three surveys asked directly about good
conduct time, the results nonetheless strongly suggest that most
Wisconsin voters would be open to a well-designed GCT proposal.
Some of the most pertinent results included strong support for each of
the following statements:
• “Criminals who have genuinely turned their lives around deserve
a second chance”: 85% of Wisconsin voters agree, while only 10%
disagree.178
• “If the prison system did more to foster rehabilitation, Wisconsin
would be a safer place”: 70% agree, 20% disagree.179
• “Wisconsin
should
recognize
prisoners’
rehabilitative
accomplishments by awarding credits toward early release”: 67%
agree, 24% disagree.180
• In determining a prisoner’s release date, it is important to take
into account his “record of good behavior in prison”: 88% say
either “very important” or “somewhat import,” while only 11%
say “not important.”181

MARQ. U. L. SCH. POLL, http://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/MLSP22
Methodology.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AZM2-XH2E. Both landline (sixty-seven
percent of the sample) and cell phone (thirty-three percent of the sample) numbers were
included in the random digit dialing technique. Id. The margin of error for a single
percentage in a sample of 804 respondents is plus or minus 3.5 percentage points. Id.
The 2012 and 2013 Polls were administered in the same manner. The 2013 Poll was
comprised of 713 Wisconsin registered voters and had a margin of error of 3.7 percentage
points. Methodology: Marquette University Law School Poll, July 2013, MARQ. U. L. SCH.
POLL, available at https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/MLSP17Metho
dology.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L3H8-XA9C. The 2012 Poll was comprised of 697
registered voters and had a margin of error of plus or minus 3.8 percentage points.
Methodology: Marquette University Law School Poll, July 5–8, 2012, MARQ. U. L. SCH. POLL,
available at https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/MLSP8_Methdology.p
df, archived at http://perma.cc/TCM4-9TYF.
178. MARQ. UNIV. LAW SCH. POLL, MARQUETTE LAW SCHOOL POLL TOPLINES —
JULY 5–8, 2012, at Q26a (2012) [hereinafter 2012 TOPLINES], available at
https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/MLSP8_Toplines.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/9A5S-2P3Z.
179. Id. at Q26b.
180. Id. at Q26c.
181. MARQ. UNIV. LAW SCH. POLL, MARQUETTE LAW SCHOOL POLL, JULY 15–
18, 2013, at Q24 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 TOPLINES], available at https://law.marquette.edu/po
ll/results-data/, archived at http://perma.cc/8F6B-WK2C.
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Perhaps most remarkably, we found that 55% of voters in 2012,182
and 54.5% of voters in 2013,183 agreed that “[o]nce a prisoner has served
at least half of his term, he should be released from prison and given a
less costly form of punishment if he can demonstrate that he is no longer
a threat to society.”184 If adopted, such a reform would at least arguably
be a far more radical departure from hyper-determinacy than the Doyle
reforms of 2009–2011.185 Moreover, in 2014, an even higher percentage
of respondents (66.4%) agreed with a more moderate version of the
statement, calling for potential release at the two-thirds mark of the
prison term.186
To be sure, we also found substantial support for truth in sentencing:
sixty-three percent in 2012187 and sixty-six percent in 2013.188 But, given
comparable levels of support for various forms of indeterminacy, it is
clear that not all TIS supporters equate TIS with hyper-determinacy.
Recall, in fact, that many states have adopted “truth in sentencing” laws
that are not nearly as rigid as Wisconsin’s.189 Indeed, for purposes of our
survey, we defined “truth in sentencing” by reference to the abolition of
parole,190 so much of the popular support for TIS may result from
particular negative associations with parole in Wisconsin,191 rather than
from a more generalized opposition to indeterminacy.
Support for more flexible approaches likely comes in part from a
widespread belief that the correctional system can and should do more
to promote prisoner rehabilitation. Again, seventy percent agreed that
“[i]f the prison system did more to foster rehabilitation, Wisconsin
would be a safer place.”192 Similarly, 74.1% of respondents indicated
that it was “very important” or “absolutely essential” for the criminaljustice system to rehabilitate offenders and help them to become

182. 2012 TOPLINES, supra note 178, at Q26g.
183. 2013 TOPLINES, supra note 181, at Q19.
184. 2012 TOPLINES, supra note 178, at Q26g.
185. See supra Part II.D.
186. 2014 TOPLINES, supra note 138, at Q30.
187. 2012 TOPLINES, supra note 178, at Q25c.
188. 2013 TOPLINES, supra note 181, at Q23.
189. See SABOL ET AL., supra note 5, at 7–9.
190. MARQ. UNIV. LAW SCH. POLL, MARQUETTE LAW SCHOOL POLL —JULY
15−18, 2013, at Q21 (2013), available at https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/20
13/07/MLSP17Instrument.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/NA9S-8W3C.
191. See supra Part II.C.
192. 2012 TOPLINES, supra note 178, at Q26b.
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contributing members of society.193 We have indeed come a long way
from the era of “nothing works.”
Support for flexibility also likely comes in part from a desire for the
state to do a better job of reserving expensive prison beds for the truly
dangerous. Note, for instance, the way that the question about halfway
release was framed: “once a prisoner has served at least half of his term,
he should be released from prison and given a less costly form of
punishment . . . .”
Further underscoring the importance of cost
considerations was the high level of support we found for this statement:
Prisons are a government spending program, and just like any
other government program, they should be put to the cost–
benefit test. States should analyze their prison populations and
figure out if there are offenders in expensive prison cells who can
be safely and effectively supervised in the community at a lower
cost.194
More than fifty-five percent of Wisconsin voters indicated that the
foregoing better reflected their views than this contrasting statement:
“People who commit crimes belong behind bars, end of story. It may
cost a lot of money to run prisons, but it would cost society more in the
long run if more criminals were on the street.”195
Yet, there is also reason to believe that much of the support for
flexibility derives from moral considerations, and not just instrumental
objectives like reducing recidivism and saving money. For instance, a
full fifty-eight percent of our respondents indicated that recognizing
rehabilitative accomplishments with earlier release would be “the right
thing to do” even if it did not reduce crime.196 Similarly, fifty-four
percent of our respondents felt that “[e]ven if truth in sentencing does
not reduce crime, it would still be the right thing to do.”197 Additionally,
we found no statistically significant relationship between fear of crime
and support for either TIS or halfway release.198 Our results were thus
consistent with earlier research indicating that public support for some

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

2014 TOPLINES, supra note 138, at Q28c.
MARQ. UNIV. LAW SCH. POLL, supra note 190, at Q19, Q20.
Id.; 2013 TOPLINES, supra note 181, at Q20.
2012 TOPLINES, supra note 178, at Q26d.
Id. at Q25d.
O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10 (manuscript at 29, 42).
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penal policies is influenced more by moral-symbolic than instrumental
considerations.199
Although our Wisconsin data point to widespread public receptivity
to more flexible penal policies, they also highlight some areas of
sensitivity that must be taken into account by reformers. Simply put,
many Wisconsin voters are skeptical that there are large numbers of
prisoners who ought at present to be released. We found that fifty-eight
percent of our respondents disagreed with the statement that “[m]any of
the people who are locked up in prison do not deserve to be there.”200
Moreover, only thirty-seven percent agreed, and forty-eight percent
disagreed, with the statement that “[m]any of the people who are locked
up in prison could be safely released without endangering the
community.”201 These views may be related to the common perception
that sentences tend to be overly lenient, especially for recidivists.202 To
be sure, earlier research makes clear that these sorts of views are based
on misinformation about the criminal justice system—incorrect
generalizations from the very small percentage of cases that are covered
in the media.203 In principle, then, it seems possible that some of the
skepticism might be overcome through a public education campaign.
Still, reservations about the justice and safety of a large-scale program of
early releases might lend support to reform approaches whose impact
will unfold only at relatively slow pace, giving the public some
reassurance that releases will not be indiscriminate or overwhelm
community-supervision systems.
B. Support for Indeterminacy in the Nation as a Whole
A multitude of recent national polls help to confirm and further
illuminate results from the Marquette Law School Poll in Wisconsin.
Although these polls are national in nature, it should be recalled that
Wisconsin is a “purple” state that sits somewhere close to the nation’s

199. Tom R. Tyler & Robert Boeckmann, Three Strikes and You Are Out, But Why?
The Psychology of Public Support for Punishing Rule Breakers, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 237,
255 (1997).
200. 2012 TOPLINES, supra note 178, at Q27d.
201. Id. at Q27e.
202. We found that sixty-two percent agree that the “courts are too lenient with
criminals,” while nearly eighty-four percent agree that we “need tougher prison sentences for
repeat offenders.” 2013 TOPLINES, supra note 181, at Q16–17.
203. TONRY, supra note 100, at 34–36.
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political center of gravity.204 Thus, Wisconsin’s public opinion in the
highly politicized field of criminal justice is not likely much different
from what one might find in the nation as a whole.
National surveys find considerable interest in reducing the size of
the U.S. prison population. The Pew Center, for instance, found that
forty-five percent of respondents believe that we lock up too many
people today, as against only twenty-eight percent who believe that the
prison population is “about right” and thirteen percent who think we
lock up too few.205
In part, these attitudes may reflect fiscal concerns. For instance,
seventy-eight percent said that it would be acceptable to reduce prison
time for low-risk, nonviolent offenders in order to close budget
deficits.206 However, it may be that the public’s desire is less to reduce
corrections spending per se than to reallocate the dollars in ways that
more cost-effectively protect public safety. Consider these results:
• Eighty-four percent agree that “[s]ome of the money that we are
spending on locking up low-risk, non-violent inmates should be
shifted to strengthening community corrections programs like
probation and parole.”207

204. Wisconsin was among the nation’s most hotly contested states in both the 2000 and
2004 Presidential elections. In 2000, Democrat Al Gore defeated Republican George W.
Bush by fewer than 6,000 votes out of more than 2.5 million cast. WIS. LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE BUREAU, 2001–2002 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 936 (2001). In 2004, Democrat
John F. Kerry edged out Bush by barely 11,000 votes out of nearly three million cast. WIS.
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, 2005–2006 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 936 (2005).
Although Barack Obama won more convincing victories in 2008 and 2012, neither
Republican Senator Ron Johnson in 2010 nor Democratic Senator Tammy Baldwin in 2012
managed to win even fifty-two percent of the vote. WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE
BUREAU, 2013–2014 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 880, 920 (2013); WIS. LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE BUREAU, 2011–2012 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 882 (2011); WIS. LEGISLATIVE
REFERENCE BUREAU, 2009–2010 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 932 (2010). In gubernatorial
politics, Republican Scott Walker defeated Democrat Tom Barrett by about 125,000 votes
out of more than two million cast in 2010, and then again by about 170,000 out of nearly 2.5
million in a nationally prominent recall election in 2012. WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE
BUREAU, 2013–2014 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra, at 912; WIS. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE
BUREAU, 2011–2012 WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK, supra, at 912. Of course, the facts that
Republican Walker and Democrat Obama both won in 2012, and that Wisconsin is
represented in the U.S. Senate by both Republican Johnson and Democrat Baldwin,
demonstrate the closely divided character of the state’s politics.
205. PEW 2012, supra note 169, at 2.
206. Id. at 4.
207. Id. at 1.
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• Eighty-five percent would accept reducing prison time for lowrisk nonviolent offenders in order to reinvest in alternatives.208
• Eighty-seven percent agree that “[p]risons are a government
program, and just like any other government program they need
to be put to the cost-benefit test to make sure taxpayers are
getting the best bang for their buck.”209
• Sixty percent say that sending fewer nonserious offenders to
prison may be justified by the availability of alternatives that
decrease reoffending.210
• Sixty-three percent disfavor mandatory sentencing laws for
nonviolent drug crimes, and sixty-seven percent say that the
government should focus on providing treatment for drug users
rather than prosecuting them.211
Implicit in these findings are beliefs that rehabilitation is a feasible
goal for many offenders. These views are more explicit in a number of
other findings:
• Fifty-eight percent say that prevention or rehabilitation should be
the top priority for dealing with crime, as opposed to only
nineteen percent who favor longer sentences and more prisons.212
• Seventy-nine percent agree that “under the right conditions,
many offenders can turn their lives around.”213
• Sixty-one percent said it was “very important” to put nonviolent
offenders in treatment/job/education programs.214

208. Id. at 4.
209. Id. at 7.
210. CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY & SUSAN MARCHIONNA, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME &
DELINQUENCY, ATTITUDES OF US VOTERS TOWARD NONSERIOUS OFFENDERS AND
ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION 8 (2009).
211. PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA’S NEW DRUG POLICY LANDSCAPE: TWOTHIRDS FAVOR TREATMENT, NOT JAIL, FOR USE OF HEROIN, COCAINE 1 (2014).
212. PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCS. INT’L FOR THE NAT’L CTR FOR STATE
COURTS, supra note 104, at 20.
213. Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
214. Id. at 38.
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For nonviolent offenders, in particular, the public seems open to
early release in a number of circumstances. The Pew Center found that
eighty-six percent would accept reduced prison time for completion of
programs, eighty-three percent for good behavior in prison, and
seventy-seven percent for age or illness.215
V. GOOD CONDUCT TIME IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A review of the GCT laws in other jurisdictions helps to confirm that
this particular form of indeterminacy has been found broadly acceptable
in the United States, and also serves to highlight some of the specific
policy decisions that must be made if Wisconsin chooses to reinstitute
good conduct time. This Part begins with a general overview of the laws
of other states and then focuses on a few jurisdictions in more detail.
A. Overview
Good conduct time has proven a remarkably durable feature of
American penal policy. As noted above, good conduct time made its
U.S. appearance more than one hundred and sixty years ago, and was
established in all forty-six states by 1910.216 More than seventy years
later, in 1982, Professor James Jacobs reported that good conduct time
was still employed in forty-six states.217 Of course, Wisconsin would
eliminate good conduct time just two years later, and the Badger State
was hardly alone in curtailing or eliminating good conduct time in that
time period. My 2012 study, however, found GCT still in place in
twenty-nine states, a clear majority.218 Moreover, there has been a
recent trend in favor of GCT, with at least ten states expanding

215. PEW 2012, supra note 169, at 4.
216. See supra Part II.A.
217. James B. Jacobs, Sentencing by Prison Personnel: Good Time, 30 UCLA L. REV.
217, 226 (1982).
218. O’Hear, supra note 1, at 197. This is just the number of states with good conduct
time for inmates in state prisons. If one also included states that permitted good conduct time
for inmates in local jails, the number would be higher. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 302.43 (2011–
2012) (“Every inmate of a county jail is eligible to earn good [conduct] time in the amount of
one-fourth of his or her term for good behavior if sentenced to at least 4 days . . . .”). Note
also that my count distinguishes good conduct time, which provides credits for good behavior,
from earned time, which provides credits for participation in certain rehabilitative programs.
O’Hear, supra note 1, at 197 nn.10–11. See generally ALISON LAWRENCE, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CUTTING CORRECTIONS COSTS: EARNED TIME
POLICIES FOR STATE PRISONERS (2009).
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eligibility or otherwise liberalizing their programs since 2003.219
Additionally, GCT has been approved as part of the American Law
Institute’s ongoing Model Penal Code: Sentencing project.220
The amount of good conduct time available varies considerably by
jurisdiction, and within some jurisdictions based on offense type and
other considerations.221 Seven states offer day-for-day credit or better to
at least some classes of inmates; in these states, a sentence might
effectively be cut in half based on good conduct.222 Other states are
much stingier, awarding only three or four days of credit per month.223
Still other states have quite elaborate systems that defy easy
characterization.224 The norm, however, seems to be in the range of ten
to twenty days per month, or a reduction in sentence length of twentyfive to forty percent.225
In general, good conduct time is awarded automatically to eligible
inmates, although the statutes of two states expressly contemplate an
inmate-by-inmate monthly review as a condition of granting credit.226
Most GCT states make credit available to all or nearly all of their prison
inmates, but other states have adopted a wide range of categorical
219. O’Hear, supra note 106, app. at 1288–92 (Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, Maine,
Nebraska, Nevada, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). Note that the ten include
Wisconsin, which adopted and then repealed good conduct time as part of the 2009 Doyle
reforms. See supra Part II.D.
220 AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING —TENTATIVE DRAFT NO. 3,
§ 305.1 (2014).
221. O’Hear, supra note 106, app. at 1288–92. The remainder of this Section is adapted
from, and closely tracks, O’Hear, supra note 1, at 200–02. For further details of specific state
laws and statutory citations, see O’Hear, supra note 106, app. at 1288–92. Even more detailed
information about the GCT programs in fifteen southern states circa 2001 can be found in
TODD EDWARDS, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, CORRECTIONAL GOOD-TIME CREDITS IN
SOUTHERN STATES (2001).
222. These states are Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina (for impaired driving
offenses only), Oklahoma, Texas, and West Virginia. O’Hear, supra note 1, at 200 n.18.
223. Delaware inmates cap out at three days per month, as do South Carolina inmates
serving time on no-parole offenses, while Maine limits good conduct time to four days per
month. Id. at 200 n.19.
224. Examples include Oklahoma and New Jersey. Id. at 200 n.20.
225. Different states express this idea differently. Alaska and New York offer one-third
off the sentence. Nevada offers a credit of twenty days per month, as does South Carolina for
paroleable offenses. Colorado and Wyoming offer a credit of fifteen days per month. New
Hampshire offers a credit of 12.5 days per month. Kentucky, Maryland, and Rhode Island
offer a credit of ten days per month. South Dakota offers a credit of either four or six months
per year, depending on the length of the sentence. Id. at 200 n.21.
226. N.H REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-A:22(I) (2007 & Supp. 2013); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 41-21-236(a)(3) (2010).
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exclusions. For instance, some exclude inmates who have committed
serious violent or sexual offenses,227 or who have killed a law
Others require that an inmate work or
enforcement officer.228
participate in an education or rehabilitative program in order to be
eligible for good conduct time.229
Once awarded, credits may be forfeited for misconduct. Normally,
any fresh criminal offense committed in prison or any violation of prison
rules will suffice. A few states limit forfeiture by statute to more serious
violations.230 Other states, however, are even more expansive than the
norm in what can lead to forfeiture. New York, for instance, authorizes
forfeiture for “bad behavior” and “failure to perform properly . . .
[assigned] duties.”231 Once forfeiture is ordered, corrections officials
have broad discretion in determining how much good conduct time to
take away.232 In many states, they also have discretion either to restore
lost good conduct time233 or to suspend forfeitures.234 In any event, the

227. Louisiana and Maine are examples. Id. at 200 n.23.
228. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 138(A) (West 2004 & Supp. 2014).
229. States falling into this category include Massachusetts, Missouri, Oklahoma, and
Texas. O’Hear, supra note 1, at 200 n.25.
230. For instance, New Jersey’s statute speaks in terms of “flagrant misconduct,” and
Michigan’s of “major misconduct.” Id. at 200 n.26.
231. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 803(1)(a) (Consol. 2005 & Supp. 2014).
232. This discretion is limited by statute in some states in a variety of ways. For
instance, Delaware specifies that all good conduct time is lost when certain inmates are
convicted of a fresh crime. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4382(a) (2007). Rhode Island has a
simple day-for-day rule: “[f]or every day [that] a prisoner [is] shut up or otherwise disciplined
for bad conduct . . . there shall be deducted one day” from the prisoner’s good-conduct time.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-24(d) (2006 & Supp. 2013). Illinois caps forfeiture at one year per
infraction, 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-6-3(5)(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014), and Louisiana
at 180 days, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:571.4(B)(3) (2012 & Supp. 2013).
233. ALA. CODE § 14-9-41(f)(2) (LexisNexis 2007); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(5)(c)
(West 2007 & Supp. 2014); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 3-709(c) (LexisNexis 2008);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.33(5) (West 1998 & Supp. 2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 651-A:22(IV)(c) (2007 & Supp. 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 138(A) (West 2004 &
Supp. 2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 421.121(4) (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-24(e) (2006 &
Supp. 2013); W. VA. CODE ANN § 28-5-27(f) (LexisNexis 2013); N. CAROLINA DEP’T OF
CORR., DIV. OF PRISONS, POLICY & PROCEDURE MANUAL, ch. B, § .0111(c) (Sept. 5, 2013),
available at http://www.doc.state.nc.us/dop/policy_procedure_manual/b0100.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/63WH-5DAG.
234. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4382(b) (2007); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 498.004(a),
(c) (West 2012).
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decision-making procedures are internal, administrative procedures,
without the protections normally associated with criminal trials.235
B. Specific Jurisdictions
1. Federal System
The federal criminal justice system is no one’s idea of lenient. In
1984, Congress adopted a new sentencing regime that eliminated parole
and set the federal system on a track to rapidly escalating penalties.236
However, a longstanding good-time provision remained part of the new
regime. To this day, at the end of each year of imprisonment, a federal
inmate may receive up to fifty-four days of good-time credit,237 which
can add up to about a fifteen percent reduction in prison time—a rather

235. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 14-9-41(f)(2) (LexisNexis 2007) (Commissioner of the
Department of Corrections decides based on evidence submitted by the warden in charge);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-22.5-301(3) (2013) (“[G]ood time authorized . . . shall not vest and
may be withheld or deducted by the department.”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1253(9)(B)
(2006 & Supp. 2013) (“Any portion of the time deducted from the sentence . . . may be
withdrawn by the chief administrative officer of the state facility . . . .”); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORR. SERVS. § 3-709(a) (LexisNexis 2008) (“If an inmate violates the applicable rules of
discipline, the Division [of Correction] may revoke a portion or all of the diminution
credits . . . .”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.451(3) (LexisNexis 2013) (“The decision of the
director regarding a forfeiture is final.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-140 (West 2008) (“In case of
any flagrant misconduct the board of managers may declare a forfeiture . . . as to them shall
seem just.”); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560–62, 568–70 (1974) (holding that
Due Process Clause requires fewer procedural protections in connection with loss of good
conduct time than in connection with revocation of parole; inmates do not have right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses or right to counsel in prison disciplinary
proceedings).
236. Michael M. O’Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U.
CIN. L. REV. 749, 772–76, 783 (2006); see also Michael M. O’Hear, National Uniformity/Local
Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures to Reduce Federal-State Sentencing
Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721, 730–32 (2002). Although precise cross-system severity
comparisons are not possible, some sense of the federal system’s relative harshness can be
seen through sentencing patterns in drug cases, which probably constitute the most practically
significant area of overlap between federal and state criminal dockets. In the most recent
years for which data are available, federal courts sentenced 96.5% of drug traffickers to
prison, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2013 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS, at tbl.12 (2013), while state courts in the nation’s seventy-five largest counties
only imprisoned forty-five percent of their drug traffickers, BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009—STATISTICAL
TABLES 29 tlb.24 (2013). Moreover, the average (mean) prison sentence in the federal system
for drug traffickers was seventy-two months, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra, at tbl.13, as
compared to only forty-nine months in the seventy-five largest counties, REAVES, supra, at 30
tbl.25.
237. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (2012).

2014]

GOOD CONDUCT TIME

533

modest benefit compared to what many states offer. Moreover, at the
end of a year, if the Bureau of Prisons determines that an inmate “has
not satisfactorily complied with . . . institutional regulations,” then the
Bureau may award no credit or some other amount less than fifty-four
days.238
The Bureau has promulgated a detailed schedule of prohibited acts
and available sanctions, including the forfeiture and disallowance of
good conduct time.239 Additional regulations spell out mandatory losses
of GCT in certain circumstances.240 For instance, narcotics use in prison
is considered a “greatest severity level prohibited act,” and thus results
in a mandatory disallowance of at least forty-one of the fifty-four days of
possible credit in the year in which the violation occurred, as well as a
potential forfeiture of up to 100% of already-earned good conduct
time.241 By contrast, the use of obscene language is a “low severity level
prohibited act,” and, for a second offense in six months, will “ordinarily”
result in the disallowance of only one to seven days of good conduct
time.242
Despite a very long list of violations that may result in a loss of
good conduct time,243 the vast majority of federal prisoners benefit from
the program. In FY 2011, for instance, more than sixty-three percent of

238. Id. The amount of good conduct time is reduced to forty-two days for inmates who
have not earned and are not making satisfactory progress toward earning a GED. 28 C.F.R.
§ 523.20(c) (2013). On the other hand, federal law does provide for up to an additional year
of credit for participation in a drug abuse program. Demleitner, supra note 170, at 787–88.
There has been some controversy over the way that the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
calculates GCT credits. See id. at 785 (“Since the BOP deducts good time from the days
actually served by the prisoner rather than the sentence imposed by the judge, the maximum
amount of good time per year is effectively forty-seven days.”). The Supreme Court affirmed
the BOP’s approach in Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2511 (2010). The United States
Department of Justice supports an increase in the amount of GCT available, both for
traditional good time and for program completion. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Clemency, Parole,
Good-Time Credits, and Crowded Prisons: Reconsidering Early Release, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 42 (2013).
239. 28 C.F.R. § 541.3.
240. Id. § 541.4.
241. I assume in this example an inmate sentenced for an offense committed on or after
April 26, 1996. See id. § 541.4(a)(2).
242. Id. § 541.3 tbl.1.
243. To give a sense of the frequency of infractions in the federal prison system, one
study found that about three percent of inmates were involved in some sort of misconduct in
a single month in 2001. CAMP ET AL., supra note 162, at 17. Inmates averaged 2.23 prior
incidents of misconduct. Id. at 33 tbl.1.
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prisoners exiting federal institutions did so on the basis of GCT.244 The
federal system thus demonstrates that a jurisdiction committed to the
truth-in-sentencing ideal245 and known for its toughness can also
maintain a robust GCT program.
2. Illinois
Illinois, Wisconsin’s neighbor to the south, has a GCT system that is
both more complex and, for many offenders, much more generous than
that of the federal system. Illinois’s basic good-time rule offers day-forday credit—potentially a fifty percent reduction in sentence length.246
However, Illinois excludes a long list of offenses, mostly of a violent or
sexual nature, from the basic rule and limits good conduct time in these
cases to 4.5 days per month247—essentially, the same as the federal rule.
The day-for-day system dates to Illinois’s determinate sentencing law of
1977, which eliminated parole in the state.248 Exclusions from day-forday credit were subsequently adopted in truth-in-sentencing legislation
in the 1990s.249
In addition to this “statutory sentence credit,” Illinois also makes
available “supplemental sentence credit” to some offenders.250 This
aspect of the Illinois good-time system recently endured a period of
244. This number was obtained through a search of the Federal Criminal Case
Processing Statistics database maintained by the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S.
Department of Justice. Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5E9W-SMEB.
245. Congress promoted the spread of TIS laws in the 1990s through its truth-insentencing grants to state correctional systems. PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 1 (1999).
246. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). The dayfor-day rule was adopted as part of Illinois’s determinate sentencing law of 1977, which also
abolished parole. GOODSTEIN, supra note 170, at 19.
247. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(a)(2), (2.3)–(2.6). Those convicted of first-degree
murder or terrorism are prohibited from receiving any sentence credit. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i).
248. MALCOLM C. YOUNG, WHITE PAPER: GOOD CONDUCT CREDIT IN ILLINOIS 1
(2012), available at http://www.usprisonculture.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/WhitePaper-Good-Conduct-Credit-in-Illinois-22-Jan-2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M2TRWXUJ.
249. See ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 20, § 107.120(g) (2013).
250. Id. § 107.107. Illinois also offers “program sentence credit” for participation in
various types of programming. Id. This sort of credit I would label “earned time” and
distinguish from “good conduct time.” See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
supra note 218, at 1. The Illinois regulations also spell out rules for various other good-time
programs that apply to certain long-serving inmates who are subject to one of various earlier
sentencing and corrections systems. ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 20, § 107.107.
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substantial public controversy. In 1990, in order to deal with prison
overcrowding, the Illinois Legislature authorized the Department of
Corrections to give inmates up to 180 days of GCT beyond the regular
day-for-day system.251 Between 1990 and 2009, the Department
maintained a policy of deferring this discretionary credit until after at
least sixty days had been served in prison.252 Beginning in 2009, the
Department ended this sixty-day rule.253 Under the new system, due to
the interplay between day-for-day credits, supplemental GCT, and
credit for time served in jail during criminal proceedings, an offender
with a short (one- or two-year) sentence might be released from prison
only a few days after entering.254
In ways that echoed the
contemporaneous public controversy over the Doyle reforms in
Wisconsin, the media in Illinois publicized the new release policy and
presented what was likely a misleading picture of its effect on public
safety.255 In response, the whole supplemental program was first
suspended, and then the sixty-day rule was legislatively reimposed.256
With this restriction restored, the Department may once again award up
to 180 days of supplemental sentence credit.257
Both statutory and supplemental sentence credit may be lost
through bad conduct in prison.258 Illinois does not appear to have the
sort of detailed schedule of specific sanctions for particular infractions
that the federal system has. However, inmates may not be deprived of
more than one year of credit for any one infraction, and lost credit may
be restored later.259
251. YOUNG, supra note 248, at 2.
252. Id. at 3.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See Patrick Yeagle, Illinois Starts Giving Prison Inmates Release Credits: IDOC
Adopts Reformed Program to Lower Prison Population, ILL. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2013,
http://illinoistimes.com/article-11086-illinois-starts-giving-prison-inmates-release-credits.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/U32Q-A362.
257. ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 20, § 107.210 (2013).
258. Id. § 107.150(c).
259. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(c) (West 2007 & Supp. 2014). The Department may
unilaterally revoke up to thirty days of credit in a twelve-month period, but must obtain
approval for more extensive sanctions from the Prisoner Review Board. ILL. ADM. CODE tit.
20, § 107.150(c). Parallel rules govern the restoration of lost credits. Id. § 107.160(c). In
addition to losing credits for infractions, inmates may also lose up to 180 days for filing a
frivolous lawsuit against the state. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-3(d). Additionally, sex
offenders are ineligible for credit unless they have completed or are participating in sex
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As of mid-2012, nearly three-quarters (74.7%) of Illinois’s prison
population qualified for day-for-day credit, while an additional twenty
percent earned statutory sentence credit at a reduced rate.260 In 2013, in
the first half-year of the revived supplemental sentence credit program,
1,974 inmates (or about four percent of the prison population) received
an average of 114.3 days of supplemental credit.261 During the same
time, 126 inmates had supplemental credit revoked, with an average
penalty of 26.9 days.262
The Illinois story illustrates the political dangers of a good-time
system that is so generous as to permit releases almost immediately
upon entry to prison. But the larger, if much quieter, story from Illinois
is that the vast majority of offenders entering the state’s prisons over the
past four decades have qualified for day-for-day credits without
particular controversy. In the first wave of national sentencing reform
(1975–1984), Illinois and Wisconsin took directly opposite approaches.
While Wisconsin eliminated good conduct time and preserved parole,
Illinois eliminated parole and preserved GCT. Illinois’s approach has
clearly proven the more durable.
3. Washington
Like Illinois, Washington has a good-time system that is both more
complex and more generous than the federal system. Washington’s
basic good-time rule provides for a one-third reduction in prison
terms.263 However, inmates convicted of a serious violent offense or a
Class A felony sex offense may only earn a ten percent reduction.264
Washington refers to GCT as “earned release time,” or ERT.265 A
portion of ERT, referred to as “earned time,” is based on participation

offender treatment, unless treatment is not made available by the Department. Id. at 5/3-63(4.6).
260. ILL. DEP’T OF CORR., FISCAL YEAR 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 50 (2013).
261. ILL. DEP’T OF CORR., ANNUAL REPORT FOR SUPPLEMENTAL SENTENCE CREDIT,
MARCH 2013–SEPTEMBER 2013 (2014).
262. Id.
263. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.729(3)(d) (West 2010 & Supp. 2014).
264. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 137-30-030(1)(b) (2011).
265. Id. § 137-25-020.
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in approved programs, including work and school,266 although inmates
are not penalized if programs are not available.267
In 2003, Washington temporarily increased the maximum ERT to
fifty percent of the prison term, but the law had a sunset provision and
was permitted to expire in 2010.268 One study found that close to onequarter of the inmates released from Washington prisons in the first
thirteen months of the program were eligible for the fifty percent
reduction.269 These inmates were estimated to serve sixty-three fewer
days on average as a result of the enhanced ERT program.270
Interestingly, those released under the program were found to have
lower recidivism rates relative to appropriate comparison groups
released before the fifty percent rule went into effect.271
Under whatever rule earned, ERT may be lost for the commission of
a “serious infraction,”272 a category that is defined by regulation and
encompasses a wide range of offenses from possession of an alcoholic
beverage to escape.273 However, lost ERT may later be restored if the
inmate manages to avoid any additional serious infractions over a
twelve-month period.274
Inmates who have reached their “earned release date,” that is, the
release date taking into account any ERT reductions, may be required
to present to the Department of Corrections a viable release plan,
including approved residence and living arrangements.275 Release may
be denied if the plan is unsatisfactory from the standpoint of recidivism
risk or in other specified ways.276 In recent years, substantial numbers of
inmates, amounting to between sixteen and twenty-three percent of all

266. Id. § 137-30-030(3)(a). For instance, inmates under the thirty-three percent rule
are eligible for five days of earned time per month. Id. § 137-30-030(3)(a)(3).
267. E.K. DRAKE, R. BARNOSKI & S. AOS, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY,
INCREASED EARNED RELEASE FROM PRISON: IMPACTS OF A 2003 LAW ON RECIDIVISM
AND CRIME COSTS, REVISED 2 n.7 (2009).
268. Cecelia Klingele, The Early Demise of Early Release, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 415, 429–
30 (2011).
269. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 267, at 4.
270. Id. at 8 n.26.
271. Id. at 7.
272. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 137-30-030(2)(c) (2011).
273. Id. § 137-25-030.
274. Id. § 137-30-070(2)(b).
275. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.729(5)(b) (West 2010 & Supp. 2014).
276. Id. § 9.94A.729(5)(c).
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releases, have been delayed under this provision, typically by two to
three months.277
Although Washington, like Illinois, has recently undergone a process
of first liberalizing and then tightening up GCT, the basic one-third rule
has proven a stable, durable feature of Washington’s nationally wellregarded sentencing and corrections system.278
VI. GOOD CONDUCT TIME IN THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
Although corrections officials have viewed GCT as a helpful device
for managing prisoners since the nineteenth century, a pair of academic
researchers could, as late as 1989, lament the absence of “any systematic
empirical research” on the impact of GCT in practice.279 They observed,
“There is no empirical evidence that supports or refutes the proposition
that good time acts as an important tool in controlling the prison
environment, or that identifies the relationship between good time
release policies and prisoner behavior in the community.”280
Twenty-five years later, we now have an increasingly substantial
body of systematic empirical research on GCT. The most rigorous
studies attempt to quantify the impact within a particular state of a
change to GCT policies. The effects on which these studies focus are
prison misconduct, recidivism and crime rates, prison-population size,
277. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR., EARNED PRISON RELEASE 2 (2013).
278. See, e.g., RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES
FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM 141, 146 (2013) (noting that Washington sentencing system has
been “remarkably stable for several decades” and praising Washington sentencing
commission as “effective and well regarded”). Washington’s recidivism rate has been
consistently below both Wisconsin’s and the national average, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES,
STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S PRISONS 11 (2011),
reflecting steady declines in the state’s repeat offending since 1990, WASH. STATE INST. FOR
PUB. POLICY, WASHINGTON STATE RECIDIVISM TRENDS: ADULT OFFENDERS RELEASED
FROM PRISON (1990–2006), at 2 (2011). Washington’s policymaking in the criminal-justice
area has been supported by a unique and nationally recognized policy-analysis agency, the
Washington State Institute for Public Policy. See John Kamensky, What You Can Learn from
the Rise of “Moneyball Government,” GOV’T EXECUTIVE, July 26, 2013, http://www.govexec.
com/excellence/promising-practices/2013/07/what-you-can-learn-rise-moneyball-government/
67544/?oref=dropdown, archived at http://perma.cc/4MSC-L6EY. Washington was a pioneer
in such areas as the “three strikes” law, ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 100, at 4, and modern
civil commitment and sex offender registration laws, Richard G. Wright, From Wetterling to
Walsh: The Growth in Federalization in Sex Offender Policy, 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 124, 127
(2008).
279. David Weisburd & Ellen S. Chayet, Good Time: An Agenda for Research, 16
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 183, 187 (1989).
280. Id. at 190.
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and cost-savings. Summarized in more detail below, these studies are
generally favorable to GCT.281 However, because there is so much
variation in state sentencing and corrections policies, caution should be
exercised in generalizing from any one state’s experience with
expanding or restricting GCT; a reform that succeeds or fails in one
policy environment might well produce quite different results elsewhere.
Florida: In 1983, Florida eliminated discretionary parole, but
instituted an extremely generous GCT system in order to prevent a
large increase in the prison population,282 thus echoing Illinois’s 1977
policy changes.283 Under the new regime, between 1986 and 1994, the
average time served was only thirty-nine percent of the sentence.284
Then, in 1995, the Legislature imposed a new cap on GCT, requiring
that offenders sentenced for crimes committed on or after October 1 of
that year serve eighty-five percent of their terms.285 In order to measure
the impact of this restriction of GCT on prisoner misconduct,
researchers studied the disciplinary records of 305,228 offenders
sentenced to prison in Florida between 1990 and 2001.286 After
controlling for twenty-three variables, including those relating to offense

281. I summarize here only the post-1989 research on GCT. There are some earlier
publications discussing the impact of GCT policy reforms, but most suffer from fundamental
methodological flaws. For a discussion of these issues, see William D. Bales & Courtenay H.
Miller, The Impact of Determinate Sentencing on Prisoner Misconduct, 40 J. CRIM. JUST. 394,
395–96 (2012). Some of the more sophisticated work in the first generation of scholarship
focused on emergency release policies implemented in Illinois and Colorado in order to
address prison overcrowding. Weisburd & Chayet, supra note 279, at 189. These studies
found no difference in the recidivism rates of early-release and regular-release inmates. Id.
In any event, apart from qualitative difficulties with some of the earlier research, it also seems
preferable to focus on more recent studies because of the very different policy environment
that exists now than in the 1980s. I omit from textual discussion a 1997 New Jersey parolerestriction law, which was found in one study, counter-intuitively, to result in a reduced rate
of violent misconduct among inmates covered by the law. CANDACE MCCOY & PATRICK
MCMANIMON, JR., NEW JERSEY’S “NO EARLY RELEASE ACT”: ITS IMPACT ON
PROSECUTION, SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND VICTIM SATISFACTION 71 (2004).
Because parole rewards good behavior in a less reliable, transparent fashion than GCT, the
relationship between parole and inmate misconduct may be quite different than the
relationship GCT and misconduct.
282. Bales & Miller, supra note 281, at 395.
283. YOUNG, supra note 248, at 1–2.
284. Bales & Miller, supra note 281, at 395.
285. Kerensa N. Pate, Florida’s Truth in Sentencing Effectiveness on Recidivism Rates
10 (Apr. 1, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University), available at
http://diginole.lib.fsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4099&context=etd, archived at http://per
ma.cc/XAA2-XGT8.
286. Bales & Miller, supra note 281, at 396.
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severity and criminal history,287 the researchers found that new-law
prisoners had 91.1% greater odds of committing a prison infraction over
a five-year period than did the old-law prisoners.288
A different researcher, however, found a more positive effect from
the Florida determinate sentencing law, specifically, on recidivism
rates.289 Based on an analysis of 182,929 offenders released from Florida
prisons between 1995 and 2005,290 and controlling for twenty-four
variables,291 the researcher found that the new-law offenders had a lower
rate of felony re-offense than the old-law offenders.292 For instance, the
odds of re-imprisonment for a new felony after three years were 26.9%
lower for the new-law offenders than the old-law offenders.293 It is not
clear why offenders in the more determinate regime had reduced
recidivism; possibilities include enhanced specific deterrence and more
time in prison to complete rehabilitative programs.294
New York: In 1997, New York’s Legislature authorized a Merit
Time Program, which allowed for certain non-violent inmates to earn up
to a one-sixth reduction of the minimum term of confinement if they
achieved significant programmatic objectives and avoided any serious
In 2007, the State’s Department of
disciplinary infractions.295
Corrections Services performed a systematic review of the Program’s
first few years.296 By 2006, New York had released about 24,000 inmates
under the Program, on average about six months before their courtestablished minimum terms.297 The Department of Corrections Services
determined that the Program had saved taxpayers about $372 million in
operating costs and $15 million in capital construction.298 Additionally,
the Department found a lower recidivism rate among the early-release

287. Id. at 398 tbl.2.
288. Id. at 400. The finding was statistically significant at a level of p<.001. Id.
289. Pate, supra note 285, at 50.
290. Id. at 37, 39.
291. Id. at 46.
292. Id. at 50. The finding was statistically significant at a level of p<.001. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 75–77.
295. N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., MERIT TIME PROGRAM SUMMARY: OCTOBER
1997−DECEMBER 2006, at i (2007), available at http://www.doccs.ny.gov/Research/Reports/20
07/Merit_Time_Through_2006.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J673-8DPY.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 15.
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inmates than among nearly all other comparison groups.299 For instance,
thirty-one percent of the early-release inmates were returned to prison
within three years, as compared to a thirty-nine percent figure for all
others.300
North Carolina: In 1994, North Carolina adopted a new Structured
Sentencing Act (SSA), which abolished the state’s prior GCT system.301
Pre-SSA inmates were “credited with ‘good time’ equal to half of their
sentences, and were potentially eligible for parole.”302 Under the SSA,
by contrast, inmates were limited to “earned time” based on program
participation, which could at most reduce their sentences by seventeen
percent.303 Beginning in late 1994, some inmates were admitted to the
North Carolina prison system under the old GCT rules and some under
the new SSA, depending on the date on which they committed their
offense.304 Taking advantage of this “natural experiment” involving two
inmate groups admitted at the same time under different rules,305
researchers analyzed the disciplinary records of nearly 7,000 offenders
who entered prison during the transitional period.306 Controlling for
eight variables, including offense of conviction and prior incarceration,
the researchers found a much higher rate of discipline (nearly twenty
percent higher) among the SSA inmates than the pre-SSA inmates.307
Complementing this result, the researchers also found in interviews that
“disciplinary system personnel and nearly all of the administrators,
correctional officers, and case managers expressed the opinion that SSA
inmates are harder to manage and present more disciplinary problems
than [pre-SSA] inmates.”308

299. Id. at iii.
300. Id.
301. John M. Memory, Guang Guo, Ken Parker & Tom Sutton, Comparing
Disciplinary Infraction Rates of North Carolina Fair Sentencing and Structured Sentencing
Inmates: A Natural Experiment, 79 PRISON J. 45, 45 (1999).
302. Id. at 46.
303. Id.
304. See id.
305. Id. at 53–54.
306. Id. at 60 tbl.1.
307. Id. at 57, 65.
308. Id. at 62. Another group of researchers has replicated the quantitative results in a
separate study using more control variables. JAMES J. COLLINS ET AL., RESEARCH
TRIANGLE INST., EVALUATION OF NORTH CAROLINA’S STRUCTURED SENTENCING LAW
54–56 (1999). They found that the SSA inmates “had higher overall infraction rates—25%
higher for males and 55% higher for females.” Id. at 76.
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Washington: The Washington State Institute for Public Policy
conducted a thorough study of the impact of the 2003 expansion of
Controlling for thirteen variables, the Institute
earned time.309
compared the recidivism rates of inmates released under the new law
with the recidivism rates of three appropriate comparison groups.310
Those released earlier under the more generous GCT law exhibited
small, but statistically significant reductions in felony recidivism.311
Taking into account the economic value of reduced recidivism plus
savings in the costs of imprisonment, the Institute calculated that each
early release under the new law saved $15,359.312 The Institute also
calculated an average cost of $8,179 from each release as a result of lost
incapacitation.313 Nonetheless, the benefits remained significantly larger
than the costs, with about $1.88 in benefits for each $1 in cost.314
In sum, four of five studies discussed here point to benefits from
GCT laws in such areas as prison discipline, recidivism, and corrections
budgets. The fifth study, by contrast, pointed to negative effects on
recidivism. It should be recalled, however, that this study did not deal
with a state that eliminated GCT, but rather shifted from an extremely
generous, Illinois-type program to a more restrained, federal-type
program. Even if some rolling back of extremely generous programs
can produce recidivism-related benefits, one should not infer that full
elimination would necessarily be even more beneficial, especially in light
of the more positive recidivism findings in New York and Washington.
VII.A PROPOSAL FOR GOOD CONDUCT TIME IN WISCONSIN
A. The Case for Good Conduct Time: A Recapitulation
The key points of the preceding five parts of this Essay can be
summarized as follows:
• Good conduct by prisoners should be encouraged and recognized.
Policies along these lines send an important message that we hope
and expect prisoners to use their time behind bars constructively
and to emerge from imprisonment prepared to resume their lives
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

For background, see supra Part V.B.3.
DRAKE ET AL., supra note 267, at 6.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Id.

2014]

GOOD CONDUCT TIME

543

in the community as law-abiding citizens. Conversely, rigidly
invariable prison terms embody a harshly exclusionary attitude
that seems to deny the offender’s capacity for improvement. As
the Supreme Court has recognized, a hopeless prison term is
morally and sometimes even constitutionally suspect.
• For almost as long as prisons have been used as a standard form
of punishment in the United States, it has been recognized that
GCT credits are a useful tool for promoting institutional order
and prisoner rehabilitation, and preferable on pragmatic and
humanitarian grounds to a purely punitive disciplinary strategy.
Even through all of the national ferment in sentencing and
corrections policy in the final quarter of the twentieth century,
most states chose to retain GCT, and empirical research is
increasingly providing support for this choice.
• Fairly or not, parole had acquired some very negative associations
by the time it was abolished in Wisconsin in the late 1990s. It is
important to remember, though, that GCT and parole have quite
distinct histories and structures. Indeed, Wisconsin had GCT for
several decades before it implemented parole. Meanwhile,
Illinois, Washington, and the federal system provide illustrations
of jurisdictions that chose to retain GCT even after eliminating
parole. There is nothing unusual or illogical about having the one
and dispensing with the other.
• The arguments made against parole in Wisconsin either do not
apply, or apply with much less force, to good conduct time.
• There is nothing undemocratic about an elected legislature
imposing new rules for the way that a prison sentence is executed,
even if doing so modestly diminishes the discretionary power of
judges over punishment.
• Good conduct time can be implemented in ways that are
transparent to victims and provide ample advance notice of when
offenders will be released.
• There is no reason that good conduct time must necessarily result
in significantly earlier releases for high-risk inmates, and, indeed,
as the empirical research suggests, GCT may actually enhance
public safety by supporting prisoners’ rehabilitative efforts,
improving order and discipline in prisons, and helping to move
low-risk inmates out of costly prison beds.
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• Polling results indicate that Wisconsin voters would welcome
more flexibility with release dates, especially if this could be
accomplished without compromising public safety. Voters are
especially attuned to whether policies in this area “do the right
thing” in a moral-symbolic sense.
B. How to Structure Good Conduct Time in Wisconsin
The case for GCT is a strong one, but, in deciding how to structure
such a program in Wisconsin, it is also important to take into account a
variety of additional considerations. Victims, and for that matter also
offenders and other stakeholders, deserve a transparent system that
makes decisions in a reasonably objective, predictable way. In light of
their local knowledge and accountability, it is appropriate for judges still
to play a leading—if no longer quite so hegemonic—role in setting the
basic parameters of punishment. Rewards for good conduct should be
proportional to the significance of the conduct. Corrections officials
should have some ability to defer release dates when it is clear to them
that public safety would otherwise be jeopardized. The administrative
burdens on corrections and court personnel should be minimized.
These various considerations are sufficiently in tension with one
another that no specific reform proposal can hope to accommodate all
of them fully. The goal cannot be a perfect or cost-free system, but must
rather be a balanced system that reflects a due regard for all of the
relevant interests and avoids unnecessary or excessive costs in relation
to any of them.
In my view, Washington’s GCT system exhibits just this sort of a
good balance. It is, moreover, a time-tested system in a state that has
long been regarded as a national leader in the criminal-justice field.315
In broad outline, then, my proposal would be for Wisconsin to adopt the
Washington model, although, as detailed below, I would favor
deviations from this model in a few specific respects.
1. Maximum Amount of GCT Discount
Washington’s maximum GCT discount, amounting to one-third of
the prison term, lies in the middle range nationally. It is, for instance,
roughly midway in generosity between the federal and Illinois laws. To
be sure, reasonable arguments could be made for a federal-level (fifteen

315. See supra note 278.
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percent) or an Illinois-level (fifty percent) credit, or any point between
those extremes. No research has identified a “magic number” that
maximizes benefits and minimizes costs. The goal is to provide
meaningful encouragement and recognition of good conduct in prison
without reintroducing such variability or unpredictability into the system
that judicial sentencing decisions would lose their significance or victims
would be put in an unfair position for the purpose of release
preparations. Washington’s one-third rule seems to strike the balance
appropriately, and has also been endorsed recently by other
commentators.316 It is also in line with the thirty percent GCT discount
included in the American Law Institute’s ongoing Model Penal Code:
Sentencing project.317 Moreover, polling results in Wisconsin—finding
two-thirds support for release as early as the two-thirds mark of the
sentence—suggest that a properly designed one-third discount might
find wide support among voters, and materially more so than a one-half
discount.318
A one-third discount could be implemented through a credit system
of fifteen days per month. Every month that an inmate earns the
maximum possible GCT would be treated, in effect, as 1.5 months
served. Projected release dates could be automatically adjusted at the
end of each month to reflect GCT.
2. Conditions for Earning GCT
Views differ on whether and to what extent GCT should be available
simply for remaining discipline-free, as opposed to exhibiting more
affirmative evidence of pro-social behavior or rehabilitative effort.
Again, Washington’s approach strikes an appealing balance: maximum
GCT requires “participat[ion] in approved programs, including work
and school,”319 but the credit does not depend entirely on this.
Remaining discipline-free for a significant period of time is an
accomplishment that merits recognition, particularly in light of the many
316. For instance, Professor Richard Frase, in his recent comprehensive blueprint for
reform of U.S. sentencing systems, also supports a maximum one-third GCT discount, tied in
part to program participation. For his defense of this approach, see FRASE, supra note 278, at
69–71. Dean Demleitner favors a similar approach. Demleitner, supra note 170, at 796. The
United States Department of Justice has also recently endorsed GCT reforms that would
permit up to a one-third discount, based in part on program completion. Larkin, supra note
238, at 42.
317. AM. LAW INST., supra note 220, §305.1.
318. See supra Part IV.A.
319. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 137-30-030(3)(a) (2011).
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restrictions imposed on prisoners; the profound stresses of life in oftenovercrowded institutions; and the mental illnesses, addictions, anger,
learning disabilities, poor education and socialization, youth, and
general immaturity that so many inmates bring with them to prison. On
the other hand, a straight one-for-two credit seems an excessive reward
for simply avoiding infractions, especially for older or longer-serving
inmates who have had ample opportunity to adjust to prison life and
develop habits of compliance.320 For many inmates, something more can
and should be expected for full GCT—pro-social behavior that is more
effortful and that offers more promise of a successful reintegration into
free society. Yet, there are potential administrative difficulties and
inequities with making credit depend fully on programming; this ties
GCT to the capacity and willingness of resource-starved corrections
systems to make programming available to inmates, to the fit between
an inmate’s needs and abilities and the programs available at the
particular institution to which the inmate is assigned, and to the fairness
of the lower-level correctional employees who may make key decisions
about admission to and expulsion from the programs they manage.321
To balance the competing interests, it is possible that individually
customized, adjustable formulas could be devised for earning GCT.
However, in order to maximize transparency and limit administrative
costs, it seems preferable to adopt a simple half-and-half approach for
everyone: remaining discipline-free is rewarded at a rate of 7.5 days per
month (a potential one-sixth discount), which doubles to fifteen days
per month (one-third) during months of active program participation.322
320. See, e.g., Liqun Cao, Jihong Zhao & Steve Van Dine, Prison Disciplinary Tickets:
A Test of the Deprivation and Importation Models, 25 J. CRIM. JUST. 103, 107 (1997)
(“[D]isciplinary infraction rates are relatively high at the start of the prison sentences and
peak within the first six to nine months of incarceration; thereafter, infraction rates show a
steady downward trend over one’s stay in prison.”); Richard Tewksbury et al., supra note 162,
at 203 (“Age has consistently been found to be the most important indicator for the
likelihood of both violent and nonviolent disciplinary infractions.”).
321. Cf. MALCOLM C. YOUNG, BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH.
OF LAW, SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT: THE TRUTH ABOUT “EARLY RELEASE” FROM
ILLINOIS PRISONS 14 (2010), available at http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/files/setting-therecord-straight.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7D5B-GJTF (noting that Illinois dropped
program participation requirement for GCT in 1975 “since the Department [of Corrections]
did not have enough programs for all prisoners who desired and were eligible to engage in
them, [and] it was unfair to deny good time to prisoners who through no fault of their own
could not participate in programs”).
322. Dean Demleitner supports a similar approach, Demleitner, supra note 170, at 794–
95, as does the Model Penal Code: Sentencing project, AM. LAW INST., supra note 220,
§ 305.1. Note, too, that the pre-1984 Wisconsin system also had a mixed approach, with
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The Department of Corrections can by regulation define what programs
qualify for the enhanced GCT, perhaps taking into account the best
available evidence regarding which activities tend to reduce recidivism
risk.
3. Offense-Based Exclusions and Limitations
Many states, including Illinois and Washington, have implemented
multi-tier GCT systems, in which some offenders earn credits at reduced
rates or are excluded from GCT altogether based on their offense of
conviction or criminal history. In this regard, the more uniform federal
system offers the most appealing model. This is consistent with ideals of
simplicity and transparency. Sentencing judges, attorneys, offenders,
victims, and members of the public should be able quickly and easily to
determine the potential impact of GCT on a prison term with minimal
need for legal research or complex math. A one-third discount for
everyone is straightforward to comprehend and calculate.
Multitier systems seem intended to deny or delay release for the
classes of offenders who are believed to be the most dangerous. Yet,
these offenders have also presumably received the longest sentences.
To then also preclude or restrict their ability to earn GCT seems a
double penalty. Moreover, the safeguard operates crudely and without
regard to the full array of potentially important risk factors—risk factors
that may change considerably over the course of a very long sentence. It
would be better to address public-safety concerns regarding potential
GCT releases of truly dangerous inmates through a more nuanced
decision-making process closer to the release date. More about this
below.
4. Disciplinary Sanctions
Some or all of the otherwise-available GCT should be withheld in
months in which a substantial violation of prison rules is found. Some
effort should be made to prevent arbitrariness in the sanctioning system
and wide institution-to-institution disparities. For instance, Wisconsin
should follow Washington’s lead in defining by regulation precisely
which infractions can result in a loss of GCT.323 Whether the full
amount, or only a fraction, of potential GCT should be withheld ought
maximum GCT requiring “diligence in labor or study [that] surpasses the general average.”
WIS. STAT. § 53.12(1) (1981–1982).
323. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 137-25-030.
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to be a matter of discretion, taking into account the usual sorts of
considerations that go into disciplinary decisions.
In some jurisdictions, including Washington, sanctions may include a
forfeiture of already-earned GCT or a prospective loss of GCT in future
months.324 Washington offsets the severity of such sanctions by
permitting inmates to request that lost GCT be restored.325
These aspects of the Washington system seem in tension with the
goals of simplicity and transparency, and also heighten concerns about
arbitrariness and disparity. Wisconsin has now been running a prison
disciplinary system for many years without a generalized ability to
sanction inmates with a loss of any GCT, so it should not be viewed as
necessary to arm corrections officials with heavy GCT sanctions in most
cases now. Losses beyond the current month should be restricted to
only the most severe infractions, such as those that could be prosecuted
as felonies in their own right outside the prison context.326 Additionally,
the most GCT that can be lost for a single infraction should be capped at
some specific amount—say, one year, as Illinois does. And, if
retroactive and prospective losses of GCT are minimized in this way,
then there should be no need for a restoration system.
5. Deferral of GCT Release
In general, it seems fair to assume that the inmates who are most
successful at accelerating their release dates with GCT will be among
the safer bets for succeeding after release. However, there will
undoubtedly be some inmates who, notwithstanding good performance
in prison, seem to present unacceptable risks at release. As discussed
above, Washington addresses this concern with a law that provides for
continued incarceration for some inmates who do not have a release
plan that satisfies certain standards, including those related to risk of reoffense and community safety.327
Washington’s approach—that is, requiring an approved release plan
that adequately addresses basic risk issues before accrued GCT may be
“cashed in”—seems a sensible safeguard, although its impact in practice
324. See, e.g., id. § 137-30-030(2)(c).
325. Id. § 137-30-070(2).
326. Cf. Demleitner, supra note 170, at 796 (“In light of the long prison sentences many
inmates currently serve, good time should become irrevocable at a point to avoid the ongoing
threat of loss of good time credits. Surely prison systems have other, more immediate and
harsher sanctions available should serious misconduct occur.”).
327. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.729(5)(C) (West 2010 & Supp. 2014).
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may be unnecessarily broad; in some recent years, nearly one-quarter of
Washington’s releases have been delayed.328 Indeed, the state has
undertaken measures to try to reduce these delays, such as providing
rental vouchers for inmates whose release is deferred because of a lack
of approved living arrangements.329
In addition to making resources available to inmates in aid of
reentry, Wisconsin should also adopt protections so as to minimize the
risk that GCT releases will be delayed excessively by official
arbitrariness, bureaucratic inertia, or purely subjective views of risk. If
an inmate who has submitted a timely release plan is deferred beyond a
certain point—say, six months330—then the Department of Corrections
should be required to provide a written explanation of why the inmate
has not yet been released, with reference to an appropriate risk–needs
assessment tool, and a specific plan for what the inmate must do in order
to achieve release.
6. Relationship to Extended Supervision
An inmate released based on GCT would be treated like any other
inmate released at the conclusion of the initial term of confinement.
The inmate would be required to serve the full term of extended
supervision under his sentence, which must be no less than twenty-five
percent of the unreduced term of initial confinement.331 If revoked and
returned to prison,332 then the inmate would be eligible to resume
earning GCT toward the new period of confinement.
Current rules provide for extensions by the Department of
Corrections of the initial release date based on various types of
misconduct.333 The new possibility of loss of GCT should largely or
entirely obviate the need for these penalty provisions. They might be
eliminated, or more clearly restricted to the most severe misconduct in
situations in which there is no additional GCT to be lost.

328. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 277, at 2.
329. Id.
330. Delays in Washington have averaged between two and four months in recent years,
id., so a similar system in Wisconsin would not likely result in large numbers of plans delayed
beyond six months.
331. WIS. STAT. § 973.01(2)(d) (2011–2012).
332. Id. § 302.113(9)(am).
333. Id. § 302.113(3).
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7. Fair Notice
When imposing a prison term, the sentencing judge should be
required to state that the offender will be eligible to earn a limited time
off for good behavior in prison and to indicate when the offender will be
released if he earns the maximum amount of GCT. The judge should
also make clear that earning this maximum amount will require the
offender not only to stay out of trouble in prison, but also to participate
in programs that will help to prepare the offender for a successful return
to the community.
The DOC should be required to maintain up-to-date information on
its website regarding how much GCT each inmate has earned and the
current projected release date of each inmate in light of GCT credits.334
GCT credits and adjustments to release dates should also be
incorporated into the DOC’s victim notification service.335 Given
contemporary technological capabilities and the sort of straightforward,
objective, limited GCT system described here, there is no reason for
interested victims ever to be caught off guard by a GCT release.
Additionally, in the further interest of transparency, the DOC should be
required to make public annual reports of how much GCT credit it is
awarding and revoking, as is mandated in Illinois for that state’s
supplemental GCT program.336
8. Effective Date and Retroactivity
Implementing the proposed system will require a certain amount of
administrative rulemaking, as well as education for judges, lawyers, and
corrections personnel. In order to allow adequate time for these
activities, the system should apply only to offenders convicted of crimes
committed on or after its effective date, and the effective date should be
set at least twelve months after GCT is adopted by the Legislature.
Once the system is operational, there would be benefits to extending
it to prisoners who were convicted of crimes committed prior to the
effective date. However, doing so would raise serious fair notice
objections on behalf of victims and might also undercut assumptions
about release that were material to some charging, plea-bargaining, and
sentencing decisions. It would thus seem better to adopt a presumption
against retroactivity. There might, however, be some flexibility in
334. See supra note 143.
335. See supra note 143.
336. ILL. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 261.
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permitting some “pre-GCT” inmates to petition to be able to receive
credits. These petitions could be handled under the existing judicial
sentence-adjustment provision, which includes notification requirements
for prosecutors and victims.337 In order to prevent a flood of petitions
and to focus judicial attention on those cases in which retroactivity
would most likely be appropriate and meaningful, petitions might be
limited to nonviolent, non-sexual offenders who have served at least half
of their initial term of confinement and who have at least two years left
on this term.338 The grant of a petition would allow the inmate to begin
accruing GCT credits the next month.
C. Differences From 2009 Reforms
A proposal to adopt GCT in Wisconsin might seem on its face an
effort to revive the rejected 2009 Doyle reforms. However, any
similarities to the 2009 reforms should not lead to rejection of the
present proposal.
First, and most fundamentally, it is important to recall that the 2009
reforms were not rejected on the basis of any persuasively demonstrated
operational problems, but rather for political reasons.339 Moreover,
while the 2009 reforms included what was in effect a GCT component
(“positive adjustment time”), the critique of these reforms did not focus
in any specific way on this component, and had considerably more force
as to the more discretionary components.340
Second, the 2009 reforms contained no limitations on retroactivity,
but made GCT available on all equal basis to TIS inmates, without
regard to date of offense or sentencing.341 Such an approach not only
raises important fair notice concerns,342 but also exacerbates publicsafety concerns in light of the potential (or at least perceived potential)
for a near-term surge in returning inmates before local authorities and
the community supervision system have time to prepare. My proposal

337. WIS. STAT. § 973.195 (2011–2012).
338. Pre-TIS inmates might be excluded from this process on the ground that they have
an alternative early release opportunity available to them in the form of parole review.
339. See supra Part II.E.
340. See supra Part III.
341. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 302.113(2)(b) (2009–2010) (making positive adjustment time
available to certain classes of offenders sentenced under § 973.01 without regard to date);
WIS. STAT. § 304.06(1)(bg)(1)–(2) (2009–2010) (same).
342. See supra Part VII.B.8.
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contemplates a much slower unfolding and a reduced likelihood that
release-date expectations at sentencing will be badly disappointed.
Third, my proposal, unlike the 2009 reforms, requires participation
in approved programming in order to receive maximum credit.
Finally, my proposal includes fair-notice provisions that were not
part of the 2009 reforms.343
In sum, although my proposal in overall effect might be fairly
characterized as one that would reestablish a system of moderate
determinacy in Wisconsin, this system would differ in several important
respects from the moderate-determinacy regime that was in place
between 2009 and 2011.
VIII.CONCLUSION
Wisconsin’s present regime of hyper-determinacy cuts against the
grain of national norms, public opinion in the state, and the state’s own
longstanding traditions of release-date flexibility. The arguments for
hyper-determinacy reflect overly simplistic views of democratic
accountability, victim rights, and public safety. It is time for Wisconsin
to provide more meaningful recognition of the positive things offenders
can do while they are behind bars. While the nation as a whole has been
moving away from the prison-as-warehouse model, Wisconsin policy
still seems stuck in the cynical and harshly punitive attitudes of the
1990s.
There are a variety of mechanisms by which greater flexibility may
be returned to the corrections system, and a reasonable case may be
made for a number of different approaches. However, since the 1970s,
in Wisconsin and nationally, there has been greater emphasis on
transparency, predictability, objectivity, and uniformity in punishment.
A system of good conduct time modeled on Washington’s would respect
these important values,344 while also providing appropriate
343. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 973.01(8) (2009–2010) (indicating various aspects of
sentence that must be explained, but not including positive adjustment time); WIS. STAT.
§ 973.01(8) (2010–2011) (same).
344. Discretionary parole, by contrast, may be harder to square with these values. Cf.
GOODSTEIN, supra note 170, at 46 (noting that Illinois prisoners sentenced under new
determinate system with large GCT component expressed more positive views about equity
of system than did prisoners sentenced under old parole system). For a more extended
discussion of the advantages of GCT over parole, see Larkin, supra note 238, at 40–41.
Professor Cecelia Klingele proposes a third approach to back-end flexibility, judicial sentence
modification. Cecelia Klingele, Changing the Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial
Sentence Modification as a Promising Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465,
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encouragement and recognition for positive behavior in prison.
“[G]ood time is crucial,” as Dean Demleitner observes, “as a symbol of
hope and rehabilitative potential in an overly harsh penal regime.”345

465–66 (2010). Based in part on the controversy over Illinois’s abortive expansion of GCT in
2009, Klingele argues that judicial sentence modification may be preferable to GCT from the
standpoint of transparency, accountability, and political sustainability. Id. at 496–98, 515–21.
In this Essay, I have attempted to address transparency and accountability concerns with
GCT. See supra Parts III.A, III.B, VII. Additionally, as Part V demonstrates, GCT has
proven itself remarkably durable over many decades; the 2009 Illinois controversy was the
exception, not the rule. See also Larkin, supra note 238, at 41 (“[G]ood-time laws
significantly predate the birth of parole and never have been the subject of the type of
intensive, sustained criticism that ultimately withered parole. In the eyes of the public, goodtime laws have earned a presumption of respectability that parole lacks today.”). In any
event, there is nothing operationally or philosophically incompatible between GCT and
judicial sentence modification, which may function in a complementary manner. Indeed, in
light of all of the limitations on GCT in my proposal, there would still undoubtedly be a need
for a reexamination of the sentences of many individuals still serving time in prison long after
there is any demonstrable need for them to do so.
345. Demleitner, supra note 170, at 796.

